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The Nature of Corporate Governance: The significance of national cultural identity  
 
 
Preface 
 The thesis of this book argues that national corporate governance is extremely 
important for societies. Recently many scholars have said that a convergence of corporate 
governance is inevitable. We believe that it is true but like Mark Twain said “the report of my 
death was an exaggeration”. We show that although there is some convergence national law 
of corporate governance is thriving. We also believe that it is necessary for the identity of 
each country. The reason that national diversity in corporate governance is still widespread is 
because of the history, philosophy and economy of each county as shown in its cultural 
heritage and it gives its identity. The cultural heritage in each state is identifiable in the 
Company Law and Corporate Governance Codes.  We consider that this is crucial for the 
well being for democratic nations. Convergence in corporate governance is a threat to ordered 
commercial regulations because of the power of the preeminent economic paradigm in the 
West which is the neo-liberal model. The neo-liberal agenda that predicates deregulation, 
privatisation and the liberalisation of markets is moulding many jurisdictions into an Anglo-
American model of corporate governance which is dangerous for a number of reasons;1 
 It is an extreme sort of utilitarianism without significant ethical principles 
 It allows the growth of mega companies backed by powerful international institutions 
including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO). 
 It changes the balance of power between states, individuals and counties and the mega 
companies including the financial sector (‘the markets’) and the international 
institutions. 
 It is disastrous because of the  burgeoning inequality between nations and individuals 
 It is profoundly anti-democratic because of the powerful actors  
 It is disastrous for the environment 
Against the power of large companies and Multinational Companies (MNEs) and the 
financial institutions national policy makers are disadvantaged because of the 
imbalances. Chapter 1 is concerned with global issues coming from the pre-eminence 
of the neo-liberal agenda. Corporate governance matters because of the sort of society 
that each state wants. Imbedded in each nation issues of board structures and general 
                                                             
1 Loraine Talbot Progressive Corporate Governance for the 21st Century, Routledge 2013.  
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meetings is the whole structure of the economic management in the country. Western 
capitalism is always a compromise between ethical principles and pragmatism, God 
and Mammon, God against the Devil. We will consider in each section the tensions 
between these concepts in corporate governance. Modern discourse uses different 
words to express a concept of God. We use terms like human rights, corporate social 
responsibility, ethical principles, communitare, sustainability, democracy, public 
interest or bona fide. On the other side there are terms like efficiency, growth, 
development and necessity. In each chapter of our book we highlight the tension 
between these powerful ideas and the compromises that policy makers have made in 
different jurisdictions to reach a balance between them. We contemplate the neo-
liberal paradigm as a rigid contractual model as an economic system unable to 
imagine the value of real equality rather than simulated equality leading to significant 
consequences. A rigid contractual model will always involve significant advantages 
for the powerful unless law or regulation can rebalance the equation. The neo-liberal 
prescription involves a number of crucial tenets, including rigid interpretation of 
property rights and ownership. In Chapter 1 and 2 we show how important these 
tenets are although these concepts can be reinterpreted in a different light depending 
on the historical and philosophic foundation of each nation. We show that property 
rights and ownership is a chimera or a chameleon.. Property rights are a construct; the 
definition of ownership and property rights depends on whether there a rigid 
interpretation of them. A rigid interpretation of them allows special interests to 
flourish, a looser interpretation of property and ownership allows ethical and 
communitaire ideas to flourish in corporate governance.  In Chapter 5 we consider the 
German political consensus model which allows a common understanding of the 
interests of the community including companies. The opposite neo-liberal model is 
predicated on contract which is a rigidly contractual.  We the differences  first in 
Chapter 1 where the different definitions of property rights is starkly exposed when 
the Indians lost their lands, but thought the book it pervades all of aspects of corporate 
governance.  The stakeholder versus the shareholder debate is about ethical principles 
versus profit and the ownership of companies is part of this argument. The German 
consensus of politics is about the ownership of the ‘commons’, a public interest 
concept which has resonance in corporate governance. On the other hand the 
individualism of the American political system with its rigid adherence of property 
rights is a reason why maximisation of profit is a key part of corporate governance in 
the US. In the UK there is an uneasy compromise between neo-liberal corporate 
governance and a stakeholder model embedded in the Company Law 2006 section 
172 where there is a fig leaf for stakeholders other than shareholders.  Throughout the 
book we show these tensions between individual shareholders and the public interest 
in different jurisdictions. We wish to scrutinize the foundation of key concepts of 
corporate governance because each country understands these concepts slightly 
differently and if policy makers which to amend the law these tenets need to be 
thoroughly examined.   We hope that this might be particularly useful for policy 
makers in the transition countries including countries that are apply to join the EU but 
also when each jurisdiction reviews its corporate governance systems. 
  Our research shows that although the neo-liberal paradigm is extraordinarily 
powerful, so much so that many scholars expect that all corporate governance systems 
will be converged eventually, but there is divergence particularly in important details. 
The ongoing western recession might trigger a revolution of corporate governance2 
allowing a stakeholder model to thrive. In the meantime national policy makers need 
to get the global picture before drafting laws and corporate governance systems which 
reflects as much as possible the culture of in their county adapting it to the 
international ‘standards’ promoted by global institutions. Chapter 1 considers the 
history and philosophy of neo-liberalism and the colonisation of the neo-liberal 
paradigm on corporate governance particularly and the way that it is promoted in 
Codes, templates and standards. The contractual model of bargains and companies is 
discussed showing why a contractual model leads inevitably to inequality. When 
inequality is predominant that leads to a democratic deficit because of the imbalance 
between actors. Democracy is not just a matter of voting imbalance between powerful 
interests are crucial. Trying to balance powerless and the powerful is a fundamental 
tenet for democracy. A stakeholder model of corporate governance tends to iron out 
some of the imbalances.  There is no doubt that a principal reason for the 2007-2008 
financial crash is the imbalance between the financial sector and governments. A bank 
to big to fail is inevitably is a risk because of a conflict of interests between a society. 
The situation was a moral hazard because the risk of gambling is high. A neo-liberal 
contractual model followed by the banks allowed then to become powerful because 
there were not enough checks and balances in the companies. The shareholders 
wanted the profit, the governments wanted investments in the economy, and other 
stakeholders were powerless. Eventually this led to bail outs by the taxpayers. We see 
now the consequences of reckless borrowing which is linked to the bank crisis in the 
Eurozone. Unfortunately national policy makers can not significantly influence the 
corporate governance of big banks because the corporate governance of banks is 
regulated internationally however a system of scrutinizing public companies in each 
jurisdiction is important to make sure that stakeholders have sufficient information. 
Environmental protections by companies are become essential because of the need to 
live sustainably. The threat of climate change is enormous. Here the tensions here are 
immense because all companies consume resources in their trading and manufacture. 
Here the neo-liberal theory is particularly dangerous because of its rooted dislike of 
regulation and simultaneously the ability to use extraterritoriality especially in 
switching assets between companies. Chapter 2 discusses the convergence and 
divergence in corporate governance each jurisdiction and why public policies matter. 
We believe it is crucial to reflect the history, political ideology of each society. 
                                                             
2 Dignam, Alan., and Galanis, Michael., The Globalization of Corporate Governance, Ashgate, 2009, “the rule 
of the free-market radicals that started with Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan has ended with a big bang’. 
If that is so, then the price of that bang will be high, indeed the down payment has already by early 2009 been 
exorbitant, but perhaps in a more regulated demand managed world, stability and incremental innovation may 
come to be valued once more over excess profitability and in turn the insider corporate governance model once 
have its day in the sun, page 419.  
Differences matter if communities are to be comfortable and find their identity.   In 
Chapter 2 identifies four streams of corporate governance, of course with many 
tributaries. Roughly we have identified 1) legal based corporate governance 
scholarship focusing on shareholder rights, agency problems between shareholders 
and the management on companies and different models of boards;3 2) An economic 
analysis of corporate governance trying to assess the efficiency of different models of 
company structures;4 3) The debate between the shareholder primacy model versus 
the stakeholder design of company and whether the models are converging;5 4) A 
soft-law focus which involves wider issues including ethical principles in companies, 
including issues of sustainability, corporate social responsibility. This category 
includes the concession theory of companies6. Chapters 3-5 consider the four steams 
of corporate governance in the context of a detailed knowledge of the structures of 
companies in the USA, the UK and Germany showing how diverse they are. 
Amending or drafting company law or principles of corporate governance needs 
detailed consideration of the structure of boards or the rights of stakeholders while 
simultaneously considering the cultural identity of each nation. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
3 Andenas, Mads and Wooldrige, Frank, European Comparative Company Law, , Cambridge University, 2009, 
Plessis du Jean Jacques, Hargovan Anil, Bagaric Mirko, Principles of Contemporary Corporate governance, 
Cambridge University Press, 2011 
 
4 Dignam, Alan and  Galanis, Michael, The Globalization of Corporate Governance, Ashgate Publishing, 
2009, 
5 Hansmann, Henry and Kraakman, Reinier, "The End of History for Corporate Law" (2000). Harvard Law 
School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series. Paper 280 
6 For example: Parkinson, J, “The Socially Responsible Company” in  Addo, M, (ed) Human Rights Standards 
and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations Kluwer, The Hague, 1999, Boeger, Nina Rachel Murray, 
Rachel,  and Charlotte Villiers, Charlotte, (Eds.), Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility, Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2008, Keay,A, The Corporate Objective, Edward Elgar, 2011 
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Chapter 1 
Corporate governance global economics: the neo-liberalism paradigm. 
 
 This Chapter discusses the neo-liberal economic paradigm from several angles. We 
start with the anxiety that there is a crisis of capitalism because of growing inequalities 
globally and within countries. We believe that the increasing convergence of corporate 
governance into a neo-liberal paradigm is one of the causes of growing inequality.7  This 
Chapter traces the historical antecedences of neo-liberalism. We find that it is predicated on 
contracts which should individually fair but unfortunately bargains are inevitably unequal 
because of differences between the parties allowing inequality. A rigid adherence of 
contractual rules does not allow a fair balance between parties where there is stark differences 
between imbalances of power or riches. The uneven playing field can only be levelled by 
regulation allowing ethical and communautaire ideas to flourish in corporate governance. We 
show where the powerful neo-liberal ideas are spreading into international institutions via 
Codes and international standards influencing other jurisdictions. The World Bank and the 
OECD are promoters of a number of these initiatives. These initiatives are partly 
overwhelming the societies who which to adherence a stakeholders model of corporate 
governance. This is dangerous because if the contractual model of corporate governance 
become preeminent there will be inherent powerful actors able to challenge democratic 
legitimacy. The Chapter traces the history of the inherent inequality involved in contracts, to 
the foundation of the contractual model of companies. A contractual model of corporate 
governance has allowed the flourishing of Multinational Companies (MNEs) which are often 
more powerful than national governments. The MNEs are helped by international law which 
shelters them from some risks by structuring their enterprises in a number of jurisdictions. 
Enforcing harms against MNEs is, extremely complex partly because of the structure of the 
company veil, international norms and extraterritoriality. The power of the global financial 
sector is one of the causes of the 2007 financial crisis which is ongoing. We consider the 
links between the IMF and private banks and which fuelled the Asian crisis of 1997 and the 
current Eurozone emergency which meant that the taxpayers had to bailout the banks because 
they were so powerful and so ‘big to fail’. The crisis was fuelled by a corporate governance 
failure; the contractual model of companies was unable to incorporate other stakeholders into 
                                                             
7 BBC, 27th January 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16757564, Accessed on 22/01/2013,  Jasmine 
Whitbread, “Will I 
Inequality Finally Top the Agenda a Davos, 22/January/ 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jasmine-
whitbread/davos-inequality_b_1235591.html, accessed 22/01/2013. 
the model. The accountability of large companies is a threat to democracy not only in a crisis 
but generally. Democracy is not only about voting, a vibrant democracy does not have actors 
which are too powerful which undoubtedly MNEs are.  The coming risk of pollution and 
particularly climate change is something that corporate governance policy makers need to 
consider adapting the structure of companies in a more environmental to encourage 
sustainability.   
 
The significance of national cultural identity  
 
 
     
  One would think that the issue of corporate governance would be a purely technical 
and slightly legalistic one falling within the ambit of what we define rather strictly as 
company law. Therefore, the issue in question would fall within the interests of mainly 
academics or corporate lawyers. The truth however is very different. Corporate governance 
found itself at the very centre of a debate that relates to the very cultural identity and basic 
political choices made on the part of societies. The fact that corporate governance has 
provoked a debate which effectively touched upon the fundamental ideological choices of the 
societies in question clearly revealed the true parameters of the issue and its far reaching 
effect. The reason behind the debate that has generated hundreds of academic articles and 
books8, a very lively exchange of ideas and opinions on the part of politicians, industry and 
society and sometimes a rather overt confrontation between important parts of the society 
such as the employees and the employers is the fact that corporate governance requires the 
effective engagement of actors that lie at the heart of the most important issues for humanity. 
To consider ‘Corporate Governance’ is also to consider competing models of capitalism and 
competing global economic models. There is no doubt that that we are living in an age when 
capitalism is in crisis. Many academic commentators believe that there is   “a rapidly 
accelerating and potentially fatal human crisis of global proportions?”9  And if there is, are 
“the systemic forces nurturing the growth and dominance of global corporations . . . at the 
heart of the current human dilemma?”10 Escalating recent scandals in the financial sector, 
                                                             
8 Riley.A. C, ‘Understanding and Regulating the Corporation’ (1995) 58(4) Modern Law Review 595, 595;  
Stiglitz, J.E.‘Multinational Corporations: Balancing Rights and Responsibilities’ (2007) 101 Proceedings of the 
Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) , Attenborough D.,, ‘Giving Purpose to the Corporate 
Purpose Debate: An Equitable Maximisation and Viability Principle’ 32(1) Legal Studies 4.   Parkinson, J.E 
Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law (Clarendon Press, 1993) at 237.   
Keyes, Andrew, The Corporate Objective, Edward Elgar, 2011. Cheffins,  B, Company Law : Theory, Structure 
and Operation (Clarendon Press, 1997) at 1999,  Bottomley,  S, The Constitutional Corporation (Ashgate, 
2007),     
9 Korten , D When Corporations Rule the World, Kumarian Press, 1995, p3 
10  Korten When Corporations Rule the World p9. 
press manipulation of communications11, the increasing anomie in our societies, the 
burgeoning inequality between individuals and between states shows that our model of 
capitalism is in trouble. Rowan Williams argues that “no-one can any longer regard the free 
markets as a natural beneficent mechanism. “12I 
 If there is a crisis of capitalism today it is important to consider the root causes of the 
problems, economically, philosophically and legally. It is not good enough to divide 
specialities into watertight compartments.  Many scholars argue that powerful companies are 
a central part of a system which exacerbates poverty and inequality.13  “The world has 
become a dangerous unequal place – even for the rich14 in the major cities of the West. Debt 
services alone accounts for $200 billion a year in currency flows from the South to the North. 
. . . While 1.2 billion people – nearly a fifth of the world’s population – have to manage on 
less than a dollar a day”15, The first decade of this century has not revealed a better world for 
the poor; rather research shows that inequality has been rampant,16 and studies suggesting 
that powerful companies should have responsibilities to the planet and to stakeholders other 
than shareholders are now legion.17 However, there are comparatively few arguments18 
linking these problems to the structure of company law and corporate governance itself. The 
                                                             
11 www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/, accessed on 26/9/20012. 
1212 Interview by Hare, David with Rowan William, Guardian 9/7/2011. 
13 Dine, J,  Companies, International Trade and Human Rights, CUP 2005,  Clapham, A, “The Question of 
Jurisdiction under International Criminal Law over Legal Persons” in  Kamminga, M and Zia-Zarifi  S, (eds), 
Liability of Multinational Corporations under International Law. The Hague: Kluwer. 2000, Bakan, J, The 
Corporation: the Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power, New York, Free Press, 2004. 
14 UNDP, beyond Scarcity; Power, Poverty and the global water crisis, Human Development Report 2006. 
15 Beck, Ulrich, Power in the Global Age, Polity, Press 2005, pages 24-5. 
 And see  Green, Duncan,  From Poverty to Power,  Oxfam. 2008/9,  Stiglitz, J,  The Price of Inequality, Allan 
Lane, Penguin, 2012,  Wilkinson, Richard and Pickett, Kate, The Spirit Level, Penguin, 2009 and 2010.  
16 http://www.worldhunger.org/articles/Learn/world%20hunger%20facts%202002.htm, 
www.oxfam.org.au/refugee/public/issues/.../statistics.php, , United Nations Development Programme Report 
2010, Both accessed on 28/7/2012. 
17 For a few see:  John Ruggie, Human Rights Council, Seventeenth session, “Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other 
enterprises” A/HRC/17/31,    Zerk, Jennifer,  Multinational and Corporate Social Responsibilities: Limitations 
and Opportunities in International Law, CUP, 2006,  Eroglu, Muzaffer, Multinational Enterprises and Tort 
Liabilities, Edward Elgar, 2008,  Boeger, Nina Rachel Murray, Rachel,  and Charlotte Villiers, Charlotte, (Eds.), 
Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008,  
  
18 But see  Dignam, Alan and  Galanis, Michael, The Globalization of Corporate Governance, Ashgate 
Publishing, 2009, Zerk,  Jennifer,  Multinational and Corporate Social Responsibilities: Limitations and 
Opportunities in International Law, CUP, 2006,  Eroglu, Muzaffer, Multinational Enterprises and Tort 
Liabilities, Edward Elgar, 2008,   
links between company law and corporate governance, deepening poverty and the structure 
of company law have not yet been fully drawn.  Add the multifaceted environmental19 crisis, 
including climate change and pollution means that we need to question all of our institutions, 
including companies and the related issue of corporate governance. Companies are not a 
natural phenomenon they were crafted by societies whether by individuals or together in 
regional pacts (like the European Union (EU)) and influenced by global players like the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO)20 or Organisation for Economic cooperation and Development (OECD). Their 
behaviour and structures must be examined and scrutinised. This book charts details of 
corporate governance in the United States of America (USA), United Kingdom (UK) and 
Germany. It is not possible to consider all of the global influences which have led to the 
current international system of corporate governance, however, there is a pressing   reason to 
examine four issues; the international neo-liberal economic model, international inequality, 
democracy, and (briefly) the negative impact on the environment. To examine Corporate 
Governance without considering these would be negligence. The thesis of this book is that 
national policy makers should be supported from powerful companies and the international 
institutions which promote them. Corporate governance laws and codes should be drafted 
with democracy in mind, considering the national history and philosophy.  Democracy will 
never thrive if rich agents are able to subordinate citizens. Our research shows that although 
the neo-liberal paradigm is extraordinarily powerful, so much so that many scholars expect 
that all corporate governance systems will be converged eventually, there is divergence 
particularly in important details. The ongoing western recession might trigger a revolution of 
corporate governance21 allowing a stakeholder model to thrive. In the meantime national 
                                                             
19  Hulme, MikeWhy WhyWe  Disagree about Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, 2009,  Barbier, 
Edward B., A Global Green New Deal, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2010, www.unep.org/ 
, accessed 25/10/2012, Helm, Dieter and Hepburn, Cameron (Eds), The Economics and Politics of Climate 
Change ,Oxford University Press 2009, Stern, Nicholas, The Economics of Climate Change, Cambridge 
University Press, 2008.  Chossudovsky, M., The Globalisation of Poverty, Pluto, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 1998,  
Harrison, P,  Inside the Third World, (3rd ed) Penguin, Harmondsworth 1993,  Hertsgaard, M., Earth Odyssey, 
Abacus, London 1999, Karliner, J.,  The Corporate Planet, Sierra Club, San Francisco 1997,  Oxfam Global 
Finance, Tax Havens: Releasing the Hidden Billions for Poverty Eradication, Oxfam, Boston, 2001,   
http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/our-work/aid-development-financ, accessed on 25/10/2012,  and Oxfam 
America Oil gaz and mining: Poor Communities Pay the Price, Oxfam, 2001 Boston,  Redclift, Michael, and 
Benton, Ted  (eds) Social Theory and the Global Environment, , Routledge, 1994. 
 
 
20  Dignam, Alan., and  Galanis, Michael, “Corporate Governance and the Importance of Macroeconomic 
Context”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 28, (2008), 201. 
21 Dignam, Alan., and Galanis, Michael., The Globalization of Corporate Governance, Ashgate, 2009, “t’he rule 
of the free-market radicals that started with Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan has ended with a big bang’. 
If that is so, then the price of that bang will be high, indeed the down payment has already by early 2009 been 
exorbitant, but perhaps in a more regulated demand managed world, stability and incremental innovation may 
come to be valued once more over excess profitability and in turn the insider corporate governance model once 
have its day in the sun, page 419.  
policy makers need to get the global picture before either only considering  national corporate 
governance  in a watertight compartment which is now almost impossible or drafting laws 
and corporate governance which reflects as much as possible the culture of in their county 
adapting it to the international ‘standards’ promoted by global institutions.  However we start 
with considering the dominant   economic model, the neo-liberal paradigm.   
The Neo-Liberal Economic Model  
   
 
 “In the old political game of ‘national (welfare)’ the aim was to achieve the greatest 
possible security . . .  against a background of national homogeneity, . . . The neo-liberal  
agenda is an attempt to capture the momentary historical gains of global and political mobile 
capital and fix them institutionally . . . according to this scheme, what is good for capital is 
good for all: everyone will be get richer, and ultimately even the poor will benefit, or so the 
promise goes. The seductiveness this neo-liberal ideology,  then , lies not in giving 
selfishness a free rein or in maximizing competition, but in the promise of global justice . The 
implication is: maximizing the power of capital is ultimately the better way towards 
socialism. That is why the (welfare) state is superfluous22.        The neo-liberal philosophy 
“allocates to states the function of a guardian of free, spontaneous markets through the 
instrumentality of the ‘rule of law’23. The foundation of this theory is suspect for many 
reasons, including the concept of the ‘rule of law’ which can be bent into a number of 
shapes.24 The neo-liberal economic paradigm was first invented by the Chicago University 
economists, the so-called Milton Friedman ‘Chicago Boys’ who were recruited by the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA )to help  with the reconstruction of the Chilean economy following 
the Pinochet coup in 197325 Although Milton Friedman is the author of the modern neo-
liberal school, there is a long tradition of right wing scholars who wanted to disparage the 
state and promote markets.  Skidelsky and Skidelsky26 traces the history of the neo-liberal 
paradigm back to the enlightenment philosophers who believed that man (not women, of 
course) were rational27. They propounded a theory of utilitarianism.   Skidelsky and 
                                                             
22  Beck, U.,  Power in the Global Age, Polity, 2005, pages 4-5  
23 Birch, Kean., and  Mykhnenko, VladIntroduction., – A World Turned Right Way Up in  Birch, Kean,  &  
Nykhnenko Vlad (eds) The Rise and Fall of Neo-liberalism: The Collapse of an Economic Order?,Zed Books 
2010, page 3. 
24  Tamanaha, Brian,, Cambridge  University Press, 2004, arguing that should be a universal norm for the benefit 
for humankind.  
25  Klein, Naomi., The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (Allen Lane 2007) 7, 25-38  
 
26  Skidelsky R., and  Skidelsky E.,  How Much is Enough?, Allen Lane, 2012. 
27  Schous, Peter A., Reasoned Freedom , Cornell University Press, 1992. 
Skidelsky use the ‘Faustian Bargain’ fable to illustrate the point. The issue was that utilitarian 
theories can be good for economic growth but often the instruments that are used are 
immoral. In Christopher Marlowe’s play Dr Faust lost his soul.28 Some other authors 
augmented the fable to allow Faust to go to heaven because he did good deeds, now this is 
what is meant as a ‘win-win situation! “By the early nineteen century, in Goethe’s classic 
retelling (1808 and 1832) Faust has become a symbol of endlessly striving modern man, 
fallible but ultimately worthy of love. Goethe’s Faust can be seen as the literally expression 
of the felix culpa of the political economist. With the help of Mephistopheles, Faust does all 
of kinds of terrible, but at the end his soul goes to heaven because he has ‘striven greatly’. 
Faust’s elevation from wicked prankster to world-historic hero reflects the weakening of 
Christian orthodoxy and its absolute prohibition on evil. It insinuates the heretical thought 
that in our dealing with the Devil it is we who can come off winners”29  Keynes was also 
ambivalent about capitalism saying that “It was a civilization which unleashed bad motive for 
the sake of good results. Morality had to be put in cold storage till abundance was achieved, 
for abundance would , make possible a good life for all”30 Keynes wrote “we must pretend to 
ourselves and to every one that fair is foul and foul is fair; for foul is useful and fair is not. 
Avarice and usury and precaution must be our god for a little longer still. For only they can 
lead us out of the tunnel of economic necessity into daylight”31 The Skidelskys show us that 
Christian theology had a simple dichotomy of evil and good, but this was lost when the 
Reformation softened the orthodoxy32 This allowed  utilitarianism doctrines to  be followed 
without retribution by the devil. , “The Renaissance invented – or rediscovered – the idea of 
using human desires to govern societies rather than castigating them as wicked. The wise 
prince, wrote Machiavelli33, threats people as they are, not as they should be: he exploits their 
fickleness, hypocrisy and greed to attain his ends”34 Both doctrines are simplistic because we 
now know much more about the human brain and the complexity of the networks connecting 
the desires and emotions in the human mind35.  However the dichotomy of evil and good 
continues to be a powerful narrative and against this  utilitarian theories were propounded by 
                                                             
28  Marlowe, Christopher.,The Tragicall, History of the Life and Death of Doctor Faustus, 1604.  
29 Skidelsky and . Skidelsky How Much is Enough?, Allen Lane, 2012, page 55. 
3030 . Skidelsky and . Skidelsky How Much is Enough?, Allen Lane, 2012, page 43. 
 
31  Maynards, Keynes., John, Essays in Persuasion, The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, Yol 9, 
Cambridge University Press, 1078. Page 372, and see . Skidelsky R, Keynes; The Return of the Master, 
Penguin, 2009.’, ,  
32 . Skidelsky and . Skidelsky How Much is Enough?, Allen Lane, 2012, page47. 
33  Machiavelli, Niccolo., The Florentine History, . Charleston,S.C,  Forgotten Books, 2010, vol.2. 
34. Skidelsky and . Skidelsky How Much is Enough?, Allen Lane, 2012, page47. 
35   Eagleman, David., Incognito: The Secret Lives of the Brain, Cannongate, 2011, particularly Chapter 5 ‘The 
Brain as a team of rivals’ where the author posits the idea that the brain is similar to a democracy.    
merchant class who found a powerful voice in Bernard Mandeville (1670-1733). The 
Skidelskys cite Mandeville’s best-known work, the The Fable of the Bees, or the Private 
Vices, Publick Benefits, “ Mandeville’s bees are addicted to ‘Fraud, Luxury and Pride’, yet 
succeed, through ‘State’s Craft’, in transforming these ‘private vices’ into the public benefit’ 
of commerce and industry: 
 
The Root of Evil, Avarice, 
That damn’s ill-nature’s baneful Vice 
Was Slave to Prodigality, 
That Noble Sin; whilst Luxury 
Employ’d a Million of the Poor, 
And odious Pride a Million more: 
Envy it self, and Vanity, 
Were Ministers of Industry”36 
The authors show us how vice is slowly turned into a colourless sin by a with breathless 
public relations coup into self-interest.  The stage is set for Adam Smith’s The Wealth of 
Nations.37 The Skidelskys argue that the paradigm shift was possible because Adam Smith 
presents “humans as driven by natural desire from self-improvement, which under conditions 
of free competition leads them ‘as if an invisible hand’ to promote the public well-being. . . . 
This was a revolutionary invention. Traditional morality had conceived of society as an 
enterprise devoted to the common good . . . Smith’s doctrine of self-interest did more than 
just turn avarice into a virtue; it turned classical virtue into a vice. . . In Smith’s political 
economy, asceticism becomes the virtuous form of self-interest, the efficient cause of capital 
accumulation. Alms-giving was discouraged because it promotes idleness“38 The theology of 
the beatitudes was eclipsed “Thou shalt love thy neighbour”39 was redundant.  Utilitarian 
doctrines are very dangerous as Pogge writes “moral norms, designed to protect the 
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39 St Mathew, Chapter 5, verse 43 although the Puritans were ambivalent about capitalism, see  Sedgwick, Peter 
H, Christian Ethics, Cambridge University Press, 1999 
livelihood and dignity of the vulnerable, place burdens on the strong. If such norms are 
compelling enough, the strong make an effort to comply. But they also, consciously or 
unconsciously, try to get around the norms by arranging their social world so as to minimise 
their burdens of compliance.”40 The utopian vision of a win-win situation is a rosy vision but 
it is not reality. Instead the neo-liberal theology has given us multinational companies which 
are so powerful that governments are nearly powerless41. Neo-liberal economic theory is the 
dominant force fuelling the convergence theory which says that all company governance 
should be run on the Anglo-American, contractual model42.  For multinationals and their 
subsidiaries it is efficient in monetary terms, but significantly flawed, leaving many 
externalities in its wake. One of the externalities is the erosion of democracy. This is why 
Beck43 realises that not only has power shifted from governments and people and also that 
ethical principles are absent including  justice.44: An excellent synopsis of neoliberalism is 
found in Glinavos: 
“How, then, did a specifically neoliberal version of capitalism built on an essentially 
American model of ‘laissez-faire’ become the strand of western free market ideology that 
won the day. . .  [this has become] the theoretical underpinnings of neoliberalism, focusing in 
particular on its underlying assumptions that markets are natural; that the rationality of their 
operations is threatened by governments intervention ; that the role of law is limited ; that law 
should be subordinate to markets needs; that the ‘invisible hand’ of the market not only 
ensures efficiency  but also distributive justice.”45  
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 The recent history of neo-liberal is to found in the scholarship propounded by the 
Austrian economist and social philosopher, Ludwig Von Mises and Friedrich Von Hayek.46 
Von Mises’s axiom that ‘egoism is the basic law of society’47 led him to conclude that  
unrestricted laissez-faire, free markets and governments that are confined to the defence of 
unhampered private property rights comprised the only viable policy for the human race.48 
The neo-classicist doctrine is that that rational actors will, if left undirected, make maximally 
efficient economic decisions which will maximise their welfare, leading to an efficient 
economy where all will eventually benefit: “For more than 20 years economists were 
enthralled by so-called “rational expectations” models which assumed that all participants 
have the same (if not perfect) information and act perfectly rationally, that markets are 
perfectly efficient, that unemployment never exists (except when caused by greedy unions or 
government minimum wages) and where there is never any credit rationing.”49That this 
model is becoming increasingly discredited does not alter the fact that faithful   adherents in 
this model are acting on the theory and now it is the dominant economic paradigm for the 
world: “At the time of writing, markets have assumed mythological proportions. Like the 
Gods of ancient days, their displeasure looms over popular protestations.  In places such as 
Greece and Italy, governments stand or fall by their ability to respond to divine dictates. 
Translated into modern discourse, what is being witnessed is the practice of neoliberal 
national and transnational governance.”50 The consequences are dire for the populations of 
these countries’51, the denigration of the environment and increasing inequality but as well as 
this the decrease of democracy, including the hollowing out national states “The neo-liberal 
regime provides for globally binding decisions against individual states’ resistance, and a 
universally valid and application ‘policy mix’ is propagated accordingly. This means that 
political reforms should be oriented towards economic objectives – low inflation, a balanced 
budget, the removal of trade barriers and foreign currency controls, maximum mobility for 
capital minimum regulation of the labour market and a lean, adaptable welfare state that  
orders its citizens to work. There are the the reform objective of the neo-liberal regime . . .  it 
is supposed to be apolitical but of course it is highly political”52 This project has fundamental 
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50  Rercival,Yonit,  Phd forthcoming, Queen Mary, University of London, 2012  
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consequences for corporate governance because of the idea that convergence of systems of 
corporate governance is inevitable. It is clear that corporate governance ‘reforms’ follows the 
neo-liberal agenda orchestrated by powerful institutions including the World Bank and The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): “As part of the Reports 
on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) initiative, the World Bank has 
established a program to assist its member countries in strengthening their corporate 
governance frameworks. The objectives of this program are to 
 Benchmark the country’s corporate governance framework and company practices 
against the OECD Principles for Corporate Governance. 
 Assist the country in developing and implementing a country action plan for 
improving institutional capacity with a view to strengthening the country’s corporate 
governance framework. 
 Raise awareness of good corporate governance practices among the country’s public 
and private sector stakeholders. 
 
Promoting the neo-liberal agenda in corporate governance: standards, codes and 
templates 
The World Bank conducts corporate governance country assessments under the Reports on 
the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC)  initiative at the invitation of country 
authorities. The World Bank uses a diagnostic tool – a Template - that it has developed to 
gather pertinent information for preparing the Corporate Governance ROSC.”53 It is very 
clear that the World Bank Template of Corporate governance is significantly tilted against 
stakeholders other than shareholders; the Template propagates the canard54 that the 
shareholders are the owners55 of the company.56 The Template considers the most important 
issues of corporate governance to be the rules about shareholders’ rights and particularly their 
property rights. The Template is in a form of a questionnaire and the first section is entitles 
“Ownership and Control” question 1 about the “ownership and its concentration”57. Later in 
                                                             
53 http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_cg.html, accessed on 17th/8/2012. 
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this template a key concept of neo-liberal axioms appears, that is the message that markets 
should be ‘efficient’ without properly defining efficiency: it is certain that the template 
prefers a shareholder primacy or insider model.58 On these terms many externalities are not 
included in the definition of ‘efficiency’, especially a fair wage for employees. “A Corporate 
governance framework should be developed with a view to its impact on overall economic 
performance, market integrity and the incentives it creates for the market participants and the 
promotion of transparent efficient markets.”59 Chapter II details the importance of 
shareholders’ rights “The title is ‘The rights of shareholders and key ownership functions’: 
The corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate the exercise of 
shareholders’ rights”.60 The questions in this section are extensive, involving questions 141-
201 after this there is a wide-ranging set of questions about the market for corporate controls 
which is neo-liberal speak for takeovers which allows the powerful companies to dominate 
the international agenda and often dominate states61: “Markets for corporate control should be 
allowed to function in an efficient and transparent manner.”62  (19 questions). Chapter III 
returns to the equitable treatment of shareholders’ rights with (another 31 questions).The 
template only mentions stakeholders at question 277 where Chapter V deals with 
stakeholders: “Do any laws provide rights to stakeholders (employees, trade unions, creditors, 
customers, suppliers, consumers, and the community) to participate or have input in the 
corporate governance of the company?”. Although the section is headed ‘Stakeholders” ‘it is 
telling in its definition; it “includes constituencies other than shareholders63, such as 
employees, trade unions, creditors, customers, suppliers, consumers, and the community.”64  
The divisions between ‘stakeholders and shareholders are very glaring. Shareholders are a 
privileged class, not part of the company’s’ community, the template clearly classify the 
lambs and the goats, and as well as this evidently the shareholders are ‘owners’ and the rest 
of the stakeholders of the enterprise are not part of the polity. It is interesting that the term 
‘corporate social responsibility’ is not included although many scholars believe that the 
convergence of corporate social responsibility and corporate governance is one of the ways 
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that accountability and responsibility in companies could be fostered. Responsible capitalism 
and neo-liberal capitalism are at odds. Corporate Governance and Corporate Social 
Responsibility(CSR)  is where competing philosophies divide. To illustrate this divide is to 
look at the OECD’s Corporate Governance Code (2004) and the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises (2011) which are significantly different and, some would say, 
contradict themselves65. The OECD’s Corporate Governance Code is about regulating the 
internal management of companies; the Guidelines are concerned about external pressures on 
companies including ethical, social and environmental issues. This part of this book shows 
why these two competing Codes should be aligned by considering the risk for companies who 
ignore externalities, external stakeholders and the wider community. This means 
contemplating global issues, ethical and intergenerational externalities which should be 
internalised by companies. Zerk argues that CSR and Corporate Governance are distinct but 
related; “It is not surprising, but these are actually two separate concepts.  Corporate 
governance is generally  taken to refer to issues relating to ownership and control of 
companies, and covers topics such as decision-making, reporting and transparency, whereas 
CSR, . . . is concerned with a wider sets of relationship – with employees, suppliers, 
communities, consumers and interested NGOs.”66 In Companies, International Trade and 
Human Rights67 Dine attempted to show that Corporate Governance, Corporate Social 
Responsibility, property rights and risks are symbiotic terms, all of these terms are bound in 
with the way that society orders its economic and its justice. It is very distressing that the 
discipline of corporate governance is often considered as a separate speciality from CSR. If 
the two concepts are to be merged much research is necessary to implement concrete 
proposals,68 turning it into a solid foundation from which legislators can draft company laws 
rather than vague   statements like those appearing in the Code. Further, having identified 
society’s concessional boundaries,69 these need to be fed into the decision making machinery 
of a company and extracted from the public relations70 departments of companies. In Chapter 
5 the authors argue that in a small way this could be done by drafting a law which could 
allow government and individual to sue multinational companies in their own jurisdiction 
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including foreign subsidiaries.  If this could be done in some jurisdictions there could be a 
significant change of culture allowing better accountability for powerful companies. . 
 
Synergies and disparities between the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
(the Guidelines) 2011 71 and Principles of Corporate Governance 2004 72 
 
 If Corporate Governance should be about an ethical framework for companies 
including how companies can be expected to comply with laws and soft law initiatives, a vital 
step in making corporate governance norms effective is to marry corporate governance codes 
with ethical principles. 
 At present those concerning themselves with the methods of decision making within 
companies and the enforcement mechanisms to ensure proper decision making appear to be 
inhabiting a different planet from those drawing up guidelines and codes of conduct. 
Principally the neo-liberal ‘governance’ debate accepts the primacy of shareholders whereas 
many CSR Codes have been extended far into stakeholder territory without concerning itself 
with how implementation may change the governance rules. The disparities between the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (the Guidelines) 2011 73 and Principles of 
Corporate Governance 2004 74 (the Principles) can certainly be seen in this light.  The 
Articles of the OECD Convention promotes policies designed  
“– to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard 
of living in member countries, while maintaining financial stability, and thus to contribute to 
the development of the world economy; 
– to contribute to sound economic expansion in member as well as non-member 
countries in the process of economic development; and 
– to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory 
basis in accordance with international obligations.” 
 For those who believe that this is impossible because of the constraints of the limits of 
the planet’s resources’, this is not a good start. If growth is to be limited for reasons of 
sustainability, this principle should be integrated into corporate governance.75 After this the 
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issue is how the resources should be distributed and this is where corporate governance 
principles should start to incorporate the key elements of the Guidelines especially the 
concept of sustainability.   
 The Principles are the foundation of the World Bank Template which has been 
already considered showing the provenance of the ideas.  This section analyses the Principles 
and the Guidelines. Both start from the premise that “One key element in improving 
economic efficiency is corporate governance”.76 The Principles also commences with “the 
Rights of Shareholders”,77 contains the principle that “markets for corporate control should 
be allowed to function in an efficient and transparent manner” 78and “Anti take-over devices 
should not be used to shield management from accountability”.79 The 2000 formulation only 
nodded to such ‘stakeholders’ as are “established by law”80, the 2004 has changed this 
expanding the ‘stakeholder section’ and increasing the rights of stakeholders by recognising 
mutual agreements,81 However there is no prescription as to which constituencies should be 
regarded as stakeholders.  The 2000 formulation said “The degree to which stakeholders 
participate in corporate governance depends on national laws and practices, and may vary 
from company to company as well.”82 This has been dropped in the version of the Principles 
200483 and stakeholders have a slightly enhanced status: 
“A key aspect of corporate governance is concerned with ensuring the flow of external capital 
to companies both in the form of equity and credit. Corporate governance is also concerned 
with finding ways to encourage the various stakeholders in the firm to undertake 
economically optimal levels of investment in firm-specific human and physical capital. The 
competitiveness and ultimate success of a corporation is the result of teamwork that embodies 
contributions from a range of different resource providers including investors, employees, 
creditors, and suppliers. Corporations should recognise that the contributions of stakeholders 
constitute a valuable resource for building competitive and profitable companies. It is, 
therefore, in the long-term interest of corporations to foster wealth-creating cooperation 
among stakeholders. The governance framework should recognise that the interests of the 
corporation are served by recognising the interests of stakeholders and their contribution to 
the long-term success of the 
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corporation”84.  As we argued earlier the Principles and also the OECD Template for Country 
Assessment of Corporate Governance85are intended to promulgate the UK/US neo-classical 
model of corporate governance.  
They envisage a model of corporation law; 
1) which relies heavily on the fiction of shareholder control over management 
2) adopts the view that shareholder control over management will in some way be beneficial 
rather than simply increase the pressure for profit maximisation at all costs 
3) adopts the ‘market forces’  model of ownership control;  this model would limit or  
prevent the adoption of corporate structures mentioned elsewhere in the Code such as the 
representation of employees on boards and hinder takeovers.86 Although the Principles 
does recognise employee participation, in a significant shift from the earlier version, 
however this change is therefore baffling and incoherence given the neo-liberal tenor of 
the document. The 2004 version is also more employee friendly; “Examples of 
mechanisms for employee participation include: employee representation on boards; and 
governance processes such as works councils that consider employee viewpoints in 
certain key decisions”87   
    From the international perspective the most glaring omission in this document is the 
absence of any recognition that a drive for economic efficiency on an international basis is at 
the root of many of the malpractices in which transnational corporations have been 
implicated.88  Indeed the excessive reliance on the existing models of corporate governance in 
member states could  be seen as using subsidiary principle to shirk the responsibility to 
suggest best practice so far as the adoption of  governance models. In that respect, it is 
extremely interesting that “Corporate governance is only part of the larger economic context 
in which firms operate that includes, for example, macroeconomic policies and the degree of 
competition in product and factor markets”. A clear distinction is drawn between ethical and 
societal concerns and commercial objectives of companies. Ethical concerns seem to be the 
last issue: “In addition89, factors such as business ethics and corporate awareness of the 
environmental and societal interests of the communities in which a company operates can 
also have an impact on its reputation and its long-term success”. 90 ; Both the international 
dimension and the ‘ethical, environmental and other issues’ are treated more explicitly in the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. The two documents read very differently. 
While neither document purports to be legally binding, the extreme difference of tone may 
perhaps be explained by the distinction between the suggested standards (Guidelines) and the 
methods of achieving those (Principles of Corporate Governance). Because of an underlying 
philosophical difficulty in the structure of the marketplace, there is an insufficient match 
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between the exhortations to achieve moral probity and the suggested governance methods. 
The Guidelines were written in 2000 and reviewed on 2011. There is shift on emphasis in the 
2011 text. The both versions still adheres to the attitude that “suggests that the Member 
Countries may have a moral duty to ensure that the activities of their MNEs in host states do 
not contribute to the detriment of those states’ economies, particularly if they are less 
developed”91  However the 2000 Guidelines were mostly negative; trying to limit the damage 
that the enterprises are doing but at the same time trying to economic growth in the develop 
nations and in the developing countries. Thus “The common aim of the governments 
adhering to the Guidelines is to encourage the positive contributions that multinational 
enterprises can make to the economic, environmental and social progress and to minimise the 
difficulties to which their various operations may give rise”.92 I small positive note is struck 
in supporting sustainability.  In particular, the   processes are to take place within the 
framework of “sustainable development”. The puzzle is why there are two documents rather 
than one and the answer may be of more fundamental importance than would first appear. If 
the standards articulated in the Guidelines are to be delivered, this can surely only be through 
corporate governance mechanisms. One difference between the Principles of Corporate 
Governance and Guidelines may be in the fact that the OECD is dealing with Multinational 
companies. This is one difference from the Principles, which are intended to guide national 
corporate governance implementation. Perhaps the Guidelines were drafted without much 
hope because MNEs  have so much power that so even the OECD  are reluctant to lecture 
them. Alternatively they know that there is no legal entity known as a ‘multinational 
company’ and therefore it is extremely complex to regulate (even in a soft law way) all of the 
subsidiaries93and the parent company94 in a MNE.  Yet there is an evident reluctance to see 
the sustainable development and environmental issues as a ‘corporate governance’ concern; 
this is particularly pertinent for the later argument about growth and the sustainability of the 
planet, but as well for all ethical problems besetting all companies.95 The Principles of 
Corporate Governance states that the board of a company to has responsibility to“ promote 
transparent and efficient markets, [and] be consistent with the rule of law” 96 This is in 
                                                             
91 Muchlinski, P, Multinational Enterprises, OUP, 1995, p579. 
92 Preface, para 10. 
93 This is using a simplistic model of Multinational companies, there are a multiplicity of patterns of 
arrangements, including franchises, cross-shareholder arrangements, joint ventures etc, see  Eroglu, 
Multinational Enterprises and Tort Liabilities, Edward Elgar, 2008,  Weitzenboeck, Emily M,  A Legal 
Framework for Emerging Business Models: Dynamic Networks as Collaborative Contracts, Edward Elgar, 
2012.  
94  Dine,  Janet, “Jurisdictional Arbitrage by Multinational Companies: a national law solution”, Journal of 
Human Rights and the Environment, Vol 3, No. March 2012, pp. 44-44-69,  Zerk, Multinational and Corporate 
Social Responsibility,, Cambridge University Press, 2006, Muchlinski, P, Multinational Enterprises and the 
Law, Blackwell, 2007. 
 
 
95 Helm  Dieter and  Hepburn,  Cameron, (eds) The Economics and Politics of Climate Change, Oxford 
University Press, 2009, Meadows,  Randers,  Meadows,  Limith to Growth, Earthscan, London, 2012, Sandel, 
Michael, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets, Allen Lane, 2012 
96 OECD Principle, 1, page 17. 
contrast to “Enterprises should, within the framework of laws, regulations and administrative 
practices in the countries in which they operate, and in consideration of relevant international 
agreements, principles, objectives and standards, take due account of the need to protect the 
environment, public health and safety, and generally to conduct their activities in a manner 
contributing to the wider goal of sustainable development”97 Despite the fact that both 
documents urge the setting up of systems to monitor environmental performance, it remains 
clear that the governance model requires adherence to the rule of law, whereas the Guidelines 
exhort adherence to the wider principle of ‘sustainable development’.  The only paragraphs in 
the Principles which have a wider reach than proper compliance with law appear in the 
Disclosure and Transparency section98. On the basis that “Disclosure . . . helps improve 
public understanding of the structure and activities of enterprises, corporate policies and 
performance with respect to environmental and ethical standards, and companies’ 
relationships with the communities in which they operate”, companies are urged to “disclose 
policies relating to business ethics, the environment and other public policy commitments” 
and “risks relating to environmental activities”. However, “Disclosure requirements are not 
expected to place unreasonable administrative cost burdens on enterprises. Nor are companies 
expected to disclose information that may endanger their competitive position unless 
disclosure is necessary to fully inform the investment decision and to avoid misleading the 
investor”. So far as environmental damage is concerned, only problems that will affect the 
decisions of investors are material, informing the consumer is not necessary where a 
competitive disadvantage may be feared. This disclosure regime will only work to the benefit 
of the environment if we assume that all investors have an ethical approach. Thus a statement 
that ‘mahogany trees are being felled at a significant rate and turned into garden furniture 
netting a huge profit for investors will be unlikely to deter non-ethical investors whereas the 
other side of the story ‘we are chopping down ancient forests and creating a desert’ could be 
withheld on the basis that it is not material for investors and it would put the company at a 
competitive disadvantage.’ The Guidelines are much more positive in the environmental field 
requiring the maintenance of systems of environmental management, consultation with local 
communities, adopt a precautionary principle and prepare environmental impact reports.  
There are several other problems with the approaches in the Principles and Guidelines. 
Apart from their non-binding nature99 and the controversy over the status of corporations in 
international law (addressed above), it is also problematic that the Guidelines represent a 
form of ‘outside the company exhortation’ and it will be unlikely to be effective unless 
mechanisms to achieve sustainable development can become part of the internal governance 
systems of companies rather than outside encouragement. A third, and most fundamental 
problem is that it will not be possible to enlist company support for the wider meaning of 
‘sustainable development’ until the underlying social understanding of the purpose 
companies serves changes fundamentally so that particularly if ‘sustainable development’ 
retains its original ambience which included a significant redistributive agenda.100  The 
principal aim of MNEs is to maximise shareholder profit. It is for this reason that the 
mahogany statement may be regarded as acceptable disclosure to investors. Further, since the 
vast majority of the shareholders of MNEs live in the developed world the repatriation of 
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profits made in environmentally damaging ways represents a regressive redistribution of 
wealth which is the precise opposite of the aim of ‘sustainable development’. 
Before leaving the debate about corporate governance and the World Bank’s Template which 
was based on the revised OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2004 it is important to 
remember that the template was “designed for use as the diagnostic tool for assessing the 
strengths and weaknesses of the corporate governance framework in a particular 
country”101some small points which  should be noted:  In  Question “378 “Do board members 
have to act in good faith and in the interest of the company” which is a bland assumption that 
everyone knows what the interest of the company is and which is a key question for the rest 
of this book.  We know that there is a major debate about the inequality of directors’ 
remuneration and other less well paid employees but the Template says nothing about 
ordinary employees, nothing about the wages or conditions of the median worker or the 
proportional wage rates in the company. Again this is of great consequence in our quest to 
understand the difference corporate governance systems. What the Template confirms that the 
management is more powerful than other stakeholders. In the title section about remuneration 
the Template says “Aligning key executive and board remuneration with the longer term 
interests of the company and its shareholders. . . . C. Is board remuneration high enough102 to 
ensure that board members devote sufficient time to their duties?”103 This suggests that the 
only problem abut remuneration is whether the pay should be high enough,  although Stiglitz 
argues that corporate governance as practiced by the neo-liberal institutions are part of the 
rise of inequality.104  
  
 
The assumptions in the World Bank Corporate Governance project are an insidious way of 
controlling states’ culture into a global corporate governance system for the convenience for 
the multinational companies, including the multinational banks and their subsidiaries.  The 
neo-liberal corporate governance paradigm has not yet tipped into a slave trade mentality but 
history shows  that terrible suffering can be perpetrated by a free-trade approach.  Laissez 
faire economics led to the Atlantic Slave105 trade probably the worst example of the Faustian 
Bargain where England was enriched on back of terrible suffering: “Sugar and tobacco 
production . . . developed hand-in hand with co-erced and degraded labor: grasping for 
wealth, profit-maximising English planters relentlessly sought overseas markets, ruthlessly 
exploited fellow humans, accumulated narrowly concentrated power, and resonated very little 
to liberal ideas and higher values.”106 Corporate Governance matters because it is a 
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fundamental building block of the governance of commerce and therefore the economy of 
states and eventually the international economy. If companies are run with no compassion, 
the international economy will implode because of the endemic inequality which is the legacy 
of neo-liberal policies.  
 
Contract, Freedom, Inequality, Democracy and Regulations. 
 
The neo-liberal paradigm is a contractual based system.  In a market economy 
contract is a crucial tool, however there are some fundamental problems in a free contractual 
market. A market economy is based on the theory that each individual has freedom to trade 
and this leads to each person getting their needs and desires satisfied.  An economy which is 
mostly arranged on a contractual design means that there will be inevitably people who are 
disadvantaged. Where this happens contract can be a malign construct and eventually there 
will a paradox, people will be limited in their choices  although the whole idea of  a 
contractual model  economy was to enhance freedom. Where this happens in grossly unequal 
societies this is also a danger for democracy. If individuals are so poor that they are fighting 
to get enough food or water democracy will not be  their first priority, nor can they access 
information or debate the political issues in the nation107. 
 While at first sight an agreement between two individuals to buy and sell might seem 
a politically neutral transaction and therefore politically uncontroversial, as soon as any 
disparity of bargaining power is taken into consideration it becomes clear that the 
arrangement will tend to benefit the party who started in the more powerful position.  A  
simple example to illustrating the way that inequality can quickly exacerbate divisions 
between people is the following108: On a cold day I once had half an hour to kill before 
meeting my daughters from school. I went to buy a minor electrical item in a large electrical 
superstore. As I had some time I read (for the first time ever) the small print of terms and 
conditions of the sale, and found a term which I considered to be outrageous. I presented the 
item to the young person at the till announcing that I would like to buy the item but 
mentioning that I had crossed out this particular term as I didn’t accept it. This caused a 
delightful chaos. Of course, the person at the till couldn’t accept the changed bargain, so he 
called the supervisor, who called the store manager, who called the area manager. At this 
point, I ran out of time and left without the item. What the interlude illustrates is that large 
companies are used to dictating the terms on which they will deal. Such a contract is very far 
from being a contract between equals. Only if safeguards (such as unfair contract terms 
legislation) are enacted can the equation be rebalanced.  Teubner illustrates the notion of 
contractual unfairness in a consumer marketplace as follows: ‘A contractual term is unfair if 
“contrary to the requirement of good faith it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ 
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right and obligation arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer”’.109 Of 
course, this leaves unexplained the intractable question of which imbalances are ‘fair’ and 
what, therefore, what is meant by ‘good faith’. Teubner has pointed up some of these, in his 
work in transplanting laws between countries. Teubner argues that transplanting laws into a 
different jurisdiction is usually disastrous unless the country philosophic attuned. He uses 
contractual concepts to illustrate his concepts of fairness particularly Unfair Terms Contracts 
legislation. He illustrates the way that the UK courts  rejected  the requirement of good faith 
saying “The British courts have energetically rejected this doctrine on several occasions 
treating it like a contagious disease of alien origin  and he cites Walford v Miles110:  where the 
judge said that god faith is “inherently repugnant to the adversarial position of the parties’ 
.111For him this shows that the judicial system in the UK is imbued with contractual cultural 
connotations. The German understanding of good faith is more generous and inclusive 
involving the whole of society, not just the parties. Similarly company governance in 
Germany tends to follow a communitarian model. Arrangements for economic enterprises 
were profoundly different within continental Europe, but when the UK joined the EEC the 
existing divisions were exacerbated. German capitalism, for example, has a philosophical 
concept of ‘good faith’ which is the reverse of the UK-contractual paradigm. Teubner argues 
that arrangements in Rhineland capitalism are predicated on trust between all of the 
individuals in the company, its suppliers and their financial backers: ‘Economic action is 
closely coordinated by business association and by informal business network . . . These 
regimes give considerable autonomy to employees within the hierarchy of the organisation 
and to suppliers and deliverers within long-term cooperative networks. This opens 
opportunities for production prone to long-term cooperation, but creates simultaneously 
considerable risks that are typical for high autonomy and high trust relations.’112 Transition 
countries are particularly prone to legislate using ‘experts’ from other countries and great 
care is needed to align the fundamental philosophy of the state including constitution, judicial 
system and commercial law it will be dysfunctional.113    
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Economic Contractualism, and the rise of the Multinationals  
 
Later we will consider in detail the corporate models which are found in America, 
Germany and the UK however the most important and influential companies in the western 
world use a contractual model.  This means that always trade bargains are asymmetrical 
because of the imbalance between individuals’ bargaining position.114.  This is the well 
understood difference between the Pareto theory and the Kaldor-Hicks notion of efficiency. 
Pareto efficiency requires that someone gains and no one loses in a contract. In contrast, the 
Kalor-Hicks test accepts as efficient ‘a policy which results in sufficient benefits for those 
who gains that potentially they can compensate fully all the losers and still remain better 
off.115 Ogus explains this very simply and tellingly showing the difference between the tests 
using an example “Bill agrees to sell a car to Ben for £5,000. In normal circumstances it is 
appropriate to infer that Bill values the car at less than £5,500 (say £4,500) and Ben values it 
at more than  £5,000. (say £5,500). If the contract is performed, both parties will gain £500 
and therefore there is a gain to society-the car has moved to a more valuable use in the hard 
of Ben . . . this is said to be an “allocatively efficiently: consequence”116. Everyone is a 
gainer, this is an illustration of the Pareto efficiency test. This win-win situation is a Utopian 
vision and extremely rare because of the number of disadvantages that can be envisaged. The 
most obvious ones are power or money, therefore bargains are usually rigged because of 
imbalance between the parties. Because of the rarity of Pareto bargains a different test was 
designed, the Kaldor-Hicks principle, where in and economy the good bargains and bad 
bargains are averaged.117 Unfortunately in the Kaldor-Hicks there is no reason why the gainer 
should compensate the loser and therefore in a contract where the loser is already 
disadvantaged he will probably become further deprived. This is also one reason why there is 
a more and more unequal world now 
There is a sliding scale of contractual freedom in Western economies which allows some 
commercial laws to be enacted without proper consideration of the risk borne by the 
disadvantaged. Because of the power of MNCs they can dictate terms, to employees and 
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suppliers but also to governments. A contractual design of a free market is appears to be good 
for individual freedom but it is a chimera; freedom is  disguised as a form of neutrality and 
equality: 
 “Every stable social system possesses an order of power and wealth, but unlike historically 
prior distributive schemes, the market order avoids the imposition of a detailed pattern. 
Instead of a structure of rank and privilege fixing entitlements to wealth and power, the 
distributive mechanism of the market allocates resources to those persons able and willing to 
pay the highest price for them . . . The market order avows blindness to claims of privilege or 
force, so it recognises no claims of an inherent right to govern or to possess superior wealth . 
. . The market order lets fly the centrifugal forces of radical individualism, permitting 
philosophers to celebrate the relative fluidity of its distributive outcome and to legitimate it 
by appeals to the impervious mask of market forces. No other order so successfully disguises 
the fact that it constitutes an order at all.”118 The same argument works in exactly the same 
way at an international political level. An agreement between states with equal bargaining 
power may be considered to be politically neutral, when they are of disparate power the 
‘contract’ is of profound political importance. In this respect it is significant that the first 
quasi-judicial enforcement mechanisms at international level have been designed and operate 
to enforce international commercial law and clearly favour richer nations with more diverse 
economies. The neo-liberal design which the world is imbued is an aggressive sort of 
capitalism but it is not completely new. It has an uncanny resemblance to the way in which 
the English colonized North America. “The English could congratulate themselves on the 
honourable way they were populating North America. They could see the Indians growing 
poorer but they did not conceive that they were the agents of the Indian’s impoverishment. 
They were not taking the Indian’s land by force of arms, after all. They were buying it on the 
open market.”119 There were transactions called “Treaties” . . . but of course they weren’t 
genuine contracts, because the Indians didn’t consent to sell their land. Indians had different 
conceptions of property than European settlers had, so they couldn’t have understood what 
the settlers meant by a sale. The Indians were really conquered by force . . . but Americans 
and their British colonial predecessors papered over their conquest with these documents120 to 
make the process look proper and legal.121  What was happening for the Indians was that they 
completely missed the importance of a key concept. The Indians had a concept of property 
which land was community- owned, therefore the individual-contract idea was entirely 
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foreign for them.122 When we consider corporate governance in detail for each jurisdiction we 
will see how decisive the language and concepts are. Perhaps this can be best illustrated by 
the differences of the Anglo-American contractual model which accentuate the fictive nature 
of companies, born from negotiation by individuals agreeing a contract as against an organic 
understanding of company as a living entity which is prevalent in German jurisprudence.123 
This latter theory is more conducive for corporate social responsibility practitioners and 
academics who promote stakeholder models.124 However on the global stage, the contractual 
model of companies has been the way that Multinational Companies have enhanced their 
prestige and power with devastating consequences 125.  The argument starts with single 
companies using a contractual model and turns into the giant MNEs that we are so familiar 
now. The rise of the mega companies was engineered by the neo-liberal paradigm using 
contract, free market philosophy and deregulation. On the international stage states were  
often pressured by the neo-liberal institutions including the World Bank, the IMF and the 
WTO to believe that  growth and  development was crucial for all nations including the 
developed countries. This is now becoming challenged by a growing number of thinkers who 
believe that continuing the pattern of unlimited growth is damaging the earth and 
simultaneously bad for human health, mental and physical.126 These authors cite different 
reasons for their beliefs some use utilitarian theories others cite spiritual reasons. However if 
they are right it is will be important to incorporate these ideas in corporate governance and 
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embed it in national jurisprudence. From the global perspective this is particularly difficult 
because of the international traditional understanding of sovereignty of states; Nations 
jealously guard their own interests even though their prerogatives are more and more 
compromised by globalisation and the power of the multinational companies127.    To 
construct a global corporate governance system which balances not only national 
stakeholders’ interests but also governmental interests and global environmental issues is a 
true challenge128 So far there is no possibility of agreement on such agreement. Absent any 
agreement national corporate governance might be improved to ameliorate inequality. The 
quirks and priorities of national corporate governance will be explained in Chapters 3-5. We 
will see that although the neo-liberal paradigm is very powerful, there are significant 
differences between national corporate governance systems.  
  Multinationals legal structures and Extraterritoriality. 
 
 It is odd that many corporate governance texts ignore groups of companies 
even though Multinational companies are becoming more powerful than some states and 
governments.129 We have seen the intractable problems set by MNEs including the 
democratic deficient, environmental damage and the growing gap of inequality. We charted 
the strict jurisprudence in the UK and the USA which adheres to a stringent separation 
between shareholders and the company. In the case of Salomon130  In the House of Lords, 
Lord MacNaughten stated: ‘The company is at law a different person altogether from [those 
forming the company]: and, though it may be that after incorporation the business is precisely 
the same as it was before, and the same persons are managers, and the same hands receive the 
profits, the company is not in law the agent of the subscribers or trustee for them. Nor are the 
subscribers as members liable, in any shape or form, except to the extent and in the manner 
provided by the Act… If the view of the learned judge were sound, it would follow that no 
common law partnership could register as a company limited by shares without remaining 
subject to unlimited liability.’ The idea is that the company is an entity separate from the 
people actually involved in it. This fictional ‘legal person’ owns the property of the business, 
owes the debt to business creditors and is in full position to become a party in legal relations; 
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it can sue and be sued on its own, it can become a party to a contract and very significantly it 
retains its identity and business despite radical changes in the composition, number or 
identity of its founders and at times membership. This translates into the international context 
allowing MMNEs to play ‘jurisdiction arbitrage’131. Frequently, in the case of environmental 
hazards, a parent company can hive out risky or dirty business abroad. Problematically, if 
there is a violation of the environment the subsidiary company will generally not be sued, 
either because the venture is in a state which is politically unstable and/or lacking in effective 
environmental regulation or enforcement practices, or because the subsidiary can be starved 
of finance by the parent and placed in  danger of insolvency.  Meanwhile, suing the parent 
company is problematic because each company in the MNC group is constructed as being 
completely separate.  Each jurisdiction, moreover, has a limited jurisdictional reach, whilst, 
in effect, each company in the MNC group is insulated by the operation of the ‘corporate 
veil’ isolating the companies making up the group.  In this sense, the MNC makes a 
particularly complex target for the imposition of liability: there is no single MNC ‘entity’, as 
such.  Constructing a form of ‘enterprise liability’, however, would potentially mean that the 
whole MNC enterprise could be sued simultaneously, making it simpler to force the directors 
of each company to respect standards of environmental probity and any relevant fiduciary 
duties. The growth of MNCs has been possible precisely because most legal systems regard 
one company holding shares in another in exactly the same way as if the company were a 
human individual shareholder.132 Most legal systems take no account of the reality of the 
accumulation of power represented by a large number of companies related by interlocking 
shareholdings, despite the fact that many companies are organised in a ‘group’ structure 
wherein control is exercised over a number of subsidiaries through shares  held by a ‘parent’ 
company. While the simplest case is a hierarchy with 100% shareholding by a parent 
company there are numerous other ways of creating effective control of one company over 
others through a range of share structures and other contractual devices like franchises and 
joint ventures.133   
The fictive nature of companies gains a new level of complexity, therefore, in the case of 
MNCs, and the fundamental ‘non-existence’ of the MNC as an ‘entity’ is arguably intimately 
related to the  problem presented by the extraterritoriality of national jurisdiction.   Each 
nation-state has equal sovereign power to regulate the territory that it owns, and enacts its 
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own laws.  Companies are a legal fiction134  invented by national law. Each state possesses 
the power (and usually the exclusive power) to regulate the company and to enforce its 
liabilities.  However, as has been suggested already, MNCs  do not exist as an ‘entity’ 
defined or recognised by law.  MNCs are, rather,  complex structures made up of individual 
companies in a variety of interrelationships.135 While globalisation means that the world 
appears to be a smaller place, and while goods and people can move freely across borders, 
companies remain legally tied to the country where they are formed. The operation of equal 
sovereign power, however, normally means that regulations made in one jurisdiction, in the 
normal course of events, cannot have any impact on corporate liability in another.  This is the 
problem of extraterritoriality. The fact that MNCs are series of companies formed in different 
national legal systems and tied together in various legal ways, either by holding shares in 
each other or by various legally binding agreements between them, presents genuine 
complexity. This complexity, moreover, is exploited by MNCs.  There are numerous cases, 
for example, of parent companies exporting dirty and dangerous business to poor countries 
where regulations are minimal or not enforced; or of paying exploitatively low wages; and/or 
ignoring the environmental effects of corporate operations.136 Poorer countries, meanwhile, 
are often desperate for any foreign investment – and thus rendered especially vulnerable to 
such practices.  
 The practical implications of MNC complexity can be devastating.  Suppose, for 
example, that damage is done to the health of employees of a company. The employees will 
find it difficult or impossible to claim against the local operator in some countries, especially 
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if the legal system is structured to favour the MNC because of the need to attract foreign 
investment and/or if the legal system is corrupt or dysfunctional. Moreover, the layers of the 
corporate veil mean that the employees will find it impossible to claim against the foreign 
‘parent’ company, because it is a separate company, structured according to the laws of a 
different jurisdiction, and not legally responsible for the acts of other companies in the MNC 
group even if they are very closely tied together through share-owning  or by contractual 
arrangements. Drafting a law which encapsulates the complex range of  legal structures of 
MNCs,137 presents an extremely intricate challenge, for as we can see, each MNC is a 
complex of companies founded and governed by the commercial laws of different nation-
states. The companies can be connected in a multitude of ways, by contract, by franchising 
agreements and by cross-shareholding, yet, despite this density of interconnection, there is no 
overall legal regulation of the whole commercial enterprise.  
 Only in very exceptional cases will the courts in rich countries break with general 
practice and ‘lift the veil’, that is, look to the reality of the situation.138 Perhaps the most 
egregious example of the problem of extraterritoriality was the English case, Adams v Cape 
Industries.139 Several hundred employees of the corporate group headed by Cape Industries 
had been awarded damages for injuries incurred as a result of exposure to asbestos dust in the 
course of their employment. Many of them were dying an unpleasant and lingering death. 
The damages had been awarded by a court in Texas, but Cape Industries had no assets in 
Texas, so the claimants could get no monetary compensation there.  The claimants sought to 
enforce the claims in England, where Cape had its head office and considerable assets. The 
English Court of Appeal held that the awards could not be enforced in England against Cape 
even though one of the defendants was a subsidiary of Cape's and despite the fact that the 
group had been restructured in order to avoid liability. The purpose of restructuring, 
moreover, was blatant: The US subsidiary (which had been responsible for marketing in the 
US (North American Asbestos Corporation (NAAC)) was put into liquidation and ceased to 
exist. Instead, two new companies were formed: a company in Liechtenstein whose shares 
were held by a subsidiary of Cape, and an Illinois company ((Continental Productions 
Corporation) (CPC)) whose shares were held by the ex-president of NAAC. The two 
companies were also put in charge of US marketing. As a result of this, while there remained 
no legal link between Cape and CPC because Cape no longer held any shares, the reality was 
that the ex-president (who held all the shares) remained loyal to Cape’s interests and 
controlled CPC.  Additionally, in the case of CPC, a new legal link was introduced to add to 
the chain which connected Cape to its marketing operation. These moves were clearly and 
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openly intended to avoid liability for the outstanding claims for asbestosis injury which Cape 
knew were in the pipeline. Yet, Slade J reasoned that: 
Our law, for better or worse, recognises the creation of subsidiary companies, which, 
though in one sense the creation of their parent companies, will nevertheless under 
the general law fall to be treated as separate legal entities with all the rights and 
liabilities which would normally attach to separate legal entities ... We do not accept 
as a matter of law that the court is entitled to lift the corporate veil as against a 
defendant company which is the member of a corporate group merely because the 
corporate structure has been used so as to ensure that the legal liability (if any) in 
respect of particular future activities of the group ... will fall on another member of 
the group rather than the defendant company. Whether or not this is desirable, the 
right to use a corporate structure in this way is inherent in our law.  
And 
If a company chooses to arrange the affairs of its group in such a way that the 
business carried on in a particular foreign country is the business of the subsidiary 
and not its own, it is, in our judgment, entitled to do so. Neither in this class of case 
nor in any other class of case is it open to this court to disregard the principle of 
Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22 merely because it considers it just so to do.140 
 
 Such a legal outcome is commonplace throughout the world. This means that 
companies can export potentially liability-attracting activities away from the rich world to 
poverty stricken areas where any sort of employment, including scavenging from rubbish 
tips, is welcome and there are fewer, or no, inconvenient checks on health and safety, 
environmental or labour standards. The fact that in theory the subsidiary company in the poor 
country could be held legally answerable there is, as we have seen, no comfort.  Quite apart 
from the possibility of corruption or dysfunction in the relevant national legal system, two 
further difficulties arise: First, the parent company can simply cause its creature in the poor 
country to disappear by instructing it to liquidate and if necessary transfer any funds to the 
parent company leaving the employees with a blank space: they have no company to sue – it 
has just disappeared; Secondly, any regulatory controls are frequently bargained away, in any 
case, before the company agrees to set up a business. These realities mean that MNCs can 
play regulatory or jurisdictional arbitrage, seeking out the jurisdiction with the fewest 
protections in order to maximise profit. This is the well-known ‘race to the bottom’, 
encouraged and protected by commercial law, just as was the slave trade in earlier times.  
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There are some exceptions to the strict doctrine of national sovereignty, though rare ( 
the MNC lobby keeps a tight rein on legislation).141 Perhaps the best instance of a law  
purporting to tighten MNC accountability is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in the 
US.142  However, this Act failed to deliver on the early promise of its preceding Bill.  Zerk 
records that:  
In relation to ‘foreign corrupt practices’, for example, an early proposal to apply 
legislation directly to foreign subsidiaries of US-owned countries was rejected because of 
concerns about ‘the inherent jurisdictional, enforcement and diplomatic difficulties raised 
by the inclusion of foreign subsidiaries  of US companies in the direct prohibitions of the 
Bill. … This is despite concerns that a failure to extend the law to foreign subsidiaries 
would create a ‘massive loophole through which millions of bribery dollars would 
continue to flow’. A form of parent-based regulation of foreign companies is used 
instead: US parent companies can themselves be held liable under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA) for the acts of foreign subsidiaries outside the USA where the US 
parent company has authorised or directed ‘corrupt payments’ to be made.143  
While the new Act is a significant step forward it fails to live up to the promise of its Bill 
because disgorgement is the normal remedy, meaning that individual victims will not 
normally benefit from the legislation.144  This suggests that the profits of redress for corporate 
malfeasance will accrue to the state, not individual victims, leaving a huge blank space in 
which individual victims will have no redress, particularly in tort cases.  
 Enforcement, as already implied, is, in any case, extremely complex. The problems 
are multiple. Extraterritoriality is one problem, but there is genuine difficulty in finding 
approaches able effectively to hold MNC power accountable.  Often, for example, reliance is 
placed, unsuccessfully, upon soft power.145 In the field of corporate accountability, for 
example, there is a widespread commitment to voluntarism, reflected in certain codes or 
principles and in the discourse of ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR), which still offers 
little in the way of direct enforcement despite its potential future promise for generating more 
diffuse forms of corporate accountability.146  
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Zerk147 has documented the range of methods used by society to address the most 
egregious violations of human rights by MNCs: methods deploying a huge variety of pressure 
points, including codes, norms, reports, boycotts and internet activism.148 MNCs themselves, 
however, are becoming involved in the debate,149 and opinion on the promise of such 
initiatives, including scholarly opinion, remains sharply divided.  A genuine question 
concerns the continuing influence of the Anglo-American neo-liberal philosophy, with its 
rampant individualism and consumerism150. As we have seen, the neo-liberal, Chicago 
economic model values individualism overall ethical principles and rests on rationality, 
efficiency and information. This theory posits that a person acting rationally will enter a 
bargain which will be to his or her benefit.151 The most aggressive version of this model 
posits that a rational person wants maximisation of her assets.152 The whole structure of 
Western society is predicated on this hegemonic value system153 and all individuals are 
imbued with some version of the theory. Since companies are manmade they are not immune 
from the prevailing culture.  Because of this ethical businesses and CSR initiatives are faced 
with a powerful contraindication.  It is, in the light of this, unsurprising that Zerk argues that 
it is still extremely difficult to tell how far the core ideals of the CSR communities 
have become embedded in corporate culture. There is still plenty of scepticism within 
‘civil society’ about the level of commitment of multinationals to self-regulatory 
schemes and social and environmental reform in general. Some multinationals have 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
inroad on MNCs’ violations and possibly it will be possible to enact a hard law in an international law context 
but I think it will be  a slow process and using national law could be another channel to use, see next section. 
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seen their environmental initiatives dismissed as ‘greenwash’, while other have been 
accused of using CSR-related initiatives as a way of diverting attention away from 
bad press elsewhere or as a tactical concession to avoid stringent legislation at some 
later stage.154   
CSR seems even more limited when placed against the background of the operation of 
limited liability and the weakness of international legal enforcement mechanisms. (In 
international trade law, in fact, there are only World Trade Organisation (WTO) enforcement 
mechanisms, widely seen as being counterproductive for the strengthening of labour 
conditions and for the protection of the environment.155)  However, it may just be that the 
huge CSR effort to counter environmental transgressions by MNCs may be bearing some 
limited fruit, though the evidence remains difficult to assess.  It has been suggested that CSR 
standards are slowly becoming part of a normal societal understanding, and that CSR norms 
are becoming harder, a sort of middle way between hard law and ‘voluntary’ law.156 
Braithwaite and Drahos, for example, argue that ‘when many different types of actors use 
many dialogic mechanisms of this sort, both impressive regime regime-building and 
impressive compliance have been repeatedly demonstrated’.157  This kind of accountability is 
arguably what Ruggie means when he uses a ‘social licence’158 concept for MNC 
accountability. .159 The search for effective accountability, particularly in the face of the 
challenges of extraterritoriality, however, goes on.160 Ruggie’s final report, 161 moreover, 
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offers little to overcome the problem.  His ‘three pillars’ (which mirror the ‘protect, respect 
and fulfil’ motif of human rights standards with ‘protect, respect, remedies’), and his focus on 
‘operationalizing’ seem to produce an unsatisfying lack of effective sanctions or 
reparations.162 Paragraph 25 of his report says that ‘[a]s part of the duty to protect against 
business-related human rights abuses, States must take appropriate steps to ensure, through 
judicial, administrative, legislative or other appropriate means, that when such abuses occur 
within their territory and/or jurisdiction those affected have access to effective remedy,163 
while paragraph 26 details the principles of judicial mechanisms.  None of this, however, 
appears to amount to detailed, robust standards for effective MNC accountability, and 
extraterritoriality remains a stubborn barrier.  We have also noticed the disjunction of  
Corporate governance and Corporate  Social responsibility and  the synergies and disparities 
between the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (the Guidelines) 2011 164 and 
Principles of Corporate Governance 2004 165 
 The relative failure to hold MNCs accountable remains troubling. There are two 
remaining alternative approaches that this analysis will now consider: the first is based on the 
concept of universal jurisdiction, and the second, more promising, based on the idea of 
building a network of national laws enshrining ‘enterprise’ liability for MNCs.  The first 
alternative is embedding an international law rule which lays down a principle of universal 
jurisdiction.  There is no prospect of this solution working ever or at least only in the long 
term. The ‘revival’ of the Alien Tort Claims Act 1789 as a way of challenging corporate 
abuses has been claimed as a ‘beacon of hope’ by human rights activists.166 Unfortunately, 
even this beacon of hope has now been extinguished or at least significantly doused. In 
Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum 167 the judges by a majority said that a company could not 
be a sole defendant in a claim in an ATCA suit. There is still litigation in the US Supreme 
Court but it likely that this avenue will be blocked.168 However a different possibility could 
be opened if the German Law of Groups and the EU competition rules were to be extended 
by national legislation. (see Chapter 5) Here we next need to extend our parameters to 
consider the consequences of  a contractual economic model by considering the consequences 
of inequality and the democratic deficit 
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Inequality  
“The extent of global inequality is breathtaking. The income of the world’s 500 riches 
billionaires exceeds that of its poorest 416 million people.”169 An increasing chorus if 
academic literature, evidence from NGOs (Non-Governmental Organisations), the World 
Bank (WB), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) shows that inequality is 
becoming worse and exacerbating a range of problems from health issues (especially mental 
health) to   obesity, life expectancy and happiness.170 The causes are extremely to pinpoint 
accurately but so far many believe that at least some of the blame points to the neo-liberal 
Washington Consensus and its programme of deregulating the market, privatising public 
services and cutting the State171. This in turn gives private companies, particularly the large 
Multinational companies more power because they have more financial resources and 
therefore more power than national governments. As early as 2000 the World Bank World 
Development Reports were uncompromising. Setting out the numbers trying to live on less 
than $2 or $1 dollar a day one report (2000-2001)  notes that “This destitution persists even 
though human conditions have improved more in the past century than in the rest of history – 
global wealth, global connections and technological connections have never been greater. But 
the distribution of these gains is extraordinarily unequal . . . And the experience in different 
parts of the world has been very diverse. In East Asia the number of people living on less 
than S1 a day fell from around 420 million to around 280 million between 1987 and 1998 – 
even after the setbacks of the financial crisis. Yet in Latin America, South Asia, and sub-
Saharan Africa the numbers of poor people have been rising. And in the countries of Europe 
and Central Asia in transition to market economies, the number of people living on less than 
S1 rose more than twentyfold.”172 And, as we have already seen, some scholars argue that 
these figures underestimate the problem.173 Similar conclusions about growing inequality 
were reached by the International Labour Organisation in its 2004 report A Fair 
Globalisation174; while recognising that globalisation has great potential for good “we also 
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see how far short we still are from reaching this potential. The current process of 
globalisation is generating unbalanced outcomes, both between and within countries. Wealth 
is being created but too many countries and people are not sharing in its benefits . . . Many of 
them live in the limbo of the informal economy without formal rights and in a swathe of poor 
countries that subsist precariously on the margins of the global economy. Even in 
economically successful countries some workers and communities have been adversely 
affected by globalization. Meanwhile the revolution in global communications heightens 
awareness of these disparities.”175 “Transnational companies (TNCs) are the driving force 
behind globalisation. Through their production, trade and investment activities, they are 
integrating countries into a global market. Through their control over resources, access to 
markets, and development of new technologies, TNCs have the potential to generate 
enormous benefits for poverty reduction. However, that potential is being lost. The weakness 
of international rules, bad policies and weak governance in developing countries, and 
corporate practices which prioritise short-term profit over long-term human development are 
undermining the capacity of poor countries – and poor people – to benefit from international 
trade.”176 The immense power of corporations is indicated by a comparison between the 
economic wealth generated by corporations, measured by sales, compared with a country's 
gross domestic product (GDP). On this basis "the combined revenues of just General Motors 
and Ford  . . . exceed the combined GDP for all of sub-Saharan Africa"177 and fifty-one of the 
largest one hundred economies are corporations.178 Further, the number of transnational 
corporations jumped from 7,000 in 1970 to 40,000 in 1998, and they account for most of the 
world's trade. They also stand accused of creating the current trade rules by their influence on 
government. Drahos and Braithwaite note that US Trade representatives ask the large 
corporations what they want from a trade negotiation and then negotiate accordingly.179 
"These corporations and their 250,000 foreign affiliates account for most of the world's 
industrial capacity, technological knowledge and international financial transactions. They 
mine, refine and distribute most of the world's oil, gasoline, diesel and jet fuel. They build 
most of the world's oil, coal, gas, hydroelectric and nuclear power plants. They extract most 
of the world's minerals from the ground. They manufacture and sell most of the world's 
automobiles, airplanes, communications satellites, computers, home electronics, chemicals, 
medicines and biotechnology products. They harvest much of the world's wood and make 
most of its paper. They grow many of the world's agricultural crops, while processing and 
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distributing much of its food. All told, the Transnationals hold 90% of all technology and 
product patents worldwide and are involved in 70% of world trade."180    
Anna Grear also charters the recent changes of globalisation, including the opening of 
electronic communications, transport links, influential brands, and scientific advances and 
realises that the picture is one of transformation because of the power of transnational 
corporations. The author believes that mega-banks are clearly crucial in the world economy 
and the financial crash of 2008 and continuing instability has been a central pillar of the 
problems, saying “that there are reasons to suspect that the current crisis is not so much a 
crisis of neoliberalism but a crisis within neoliberalism concerning the best way to retain and 
protect of its fundamental tenets, structures and institutions,”181   
 With other commentators182 she argues that the financial crisis has crystallised further 
a situation which is ‘socialised’ by a strategy in which the private risk of the owners of 
capital are underwritten by the state, the losses of corporations and banks are mitigated  by 
ordinary tax-payer and are  “left holding future debts that in effect, simply pass the impact of 
the crisis to ordinary citizens”183  Originally Multinational companies made products but as 
Stiglitz has shown us the next wave of consolidation was by the financial sector led by the 
IMF and the World Bank. The first attack was in the developing countries, now the 
developed states fear the market and politician are only puppets. 
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 Till the 2007 financial crash it was a strange aspect of the ‘globalisation debate’ that 
multinational companies were in the forefront of the debate and that the biggest banks were 
able to escape scrutiny. Originally attention focused on companies which produce tangible 
items which end up with a consumer. Activists focused on the wage conditions of employees 
or the violation of human rights or the pollution of the environment. This meant that there 
was an extra veil of invisibility to the operations of giant banks. Even though by 2003 the 
total assets of the top five banks were estimated at US$4807294 million184 their activities 
have frequently been left off the globalisation agenda. This changed radically on 2007 when 
the financial crash came and the numbers look very different now.185 However, there is not a 
rigorous global reinvention of financial regulations and the IMF certainly has not changed its 
structural adjustment programmes rather in Europe it is merely supported by other institutions 
like the European Central Bank and the European Commission (the Troika)186  There is no 
doubt that the way in which the global financial architecture has managed financial crises in a 
number of recent crises  (including the ongoing crisis in the Eurozone) has given rise to 
unprecedented opportunities for banks to make huge profits while running virtually no risks. 
This is, in part because of the response that the IMF has made to those crises. Underhill and 
Zhang see the rise of multinationals as a threat to domestic political legitimacy by weakening 
states’ authority over macroeconomics and social policy and by being significant in the 
formulation of national economic policy; “integration with global financial structures has 
strengthened the position of private market actors over public authority. Powerful private 
actors come to dominate the formulation of national economic policies which, in their 
attempts to extract benefits from global integration, tend increasingly to serve the interests of 
market agents.”187 (see more in the next section of this Chapter) 
However,  the International Monetary fund has largely (rightly)  been vilified for the 
conditionality policies which it pursues, demanding severe cutbacks in social services in 
return for its loans188, rather than the financial policies which it has pursued. Recently, 
however, the financial policies behind its activities have been questioned as well as the effect 
that its structural adjustment policies and their successors have had on the poorest within 
creditor nations. Stiglitz writes  
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“The IMF is pursuing not just the objectives set out in its original mandate of enhancing 
global stability and ensuring that there are funds for countries facing a threat of recession to 
pursue expansionary policies. It is also pursuing the interests of the financial community . . . 
Simplistic free market ideology provided the curtain behind which the real business of the 
‘new’ mandate could be transacted. The change in mandate and objectives, while it may have 
been quiet, was hardly subtle: from serving global economic interests to serving the interests 
of global finance.189 Capital market liberalisation may not have contributed to global 
economic stability, but it did open up vast new markets for Wall Street.”190 This reassessment 
of the IMF turns partly on the ‘bail-out’ policies it has pursued. The allegation is that loans to 
risky areas are encouraged and underpriced because it is known that the IMF will support the 
country’s currency when a crisis threatens (see below). Eichengreen and Ruhl describe the 
‘moral hazard’ thus; “Investors, it is argued, have been able to escape the financial costs of 
crises through the extension of international rescue loans. These “bailouts” (as they are 
described by their critics} give governments the funds they require to pay off their creditors, 
who are then able to exit the country free of losses. Not being subject to the cost of crises, 
investors disregard the risks of lending, and the consequent lack of market discipline allows 
feckless governments to set themselves up for a painful fall.”191 
 The allegation that the IMF is in the service of international finance essentially flows 
from the insistence by the IMF on liberalisation, in particular capital account liberalisation. 
The intended result of this is to permit capital flows to take place freely across the world. 
However, while this may be good for the financial community, it is not necessarily good for 
developing countries. “the cocktail of free capital flows, floating exchange rates, domestic 
financial liberalisation in G3 countries, and unregulated innovations in financial instruments 
and institutions such as derivatives and hedge funds has dramatically increased financial 
instability after the collapse of the Gold- Dollar standard.”192 The instability is a result of a 
system of liberalisation based on neo-classical assumptions, including perfect information 
flows. “If one asks which of the neo-classical assumptions fail in a way that permits 
[financial] crises to develop, it is the information structure on the basis of which lending 
decisions are made. Rather than each investor deciding individually his or her expectations on 
the basis of their estimate of the fundamentals, investors make their decisions on the basis of 
what others are expected to do, resulting in herd behaviour”193This assessment is based on 
Keynes’ beauty contest analysis, referring to a game in the UK tabloid press in the 1930s in 
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which readers were asked to assess from pictures which women would be judged as the most 
beautiful by the entire readership; “in other words, readers would not win by giving their own 
opinion about the women’s beauty, not even by assessing what others’ personal opinions 
would be, but by guessing what people would, on average, believe average opinion to be. In 
financial markets, a trader will not bid a price according to what he or she believes an asset’s 
fundamental value to be, but according to what he or she assesses average opinion to be about 
average opinion of the asset’s value. The beauty contest analogy helps understand why 
market participants tend to engage in ‘momentous trading’ (i.e. herd behaviour) and why 
market valuations are subject to sudden shifts in ‘market sentiment’.”194  
 Underhill and Zhang point out that “more than seventy financial and monetary crises 
of different proportions and characteristics have occurred in both developed and developing 
countries over the past two decades.”195 They see as “A common background to these 
developments . . . the intensifying process of global financial liberalisation and integration . . 
. As financial crises have become more frequent and more severe over the past two decades, 
this has raised the question of whether the growing frequency and severity of crises correlate 
with the emergence of this liberal and transnational financial order.”196 
While domestic policies have a large part to play in countries’ financial crises, many studies 
now show that two other factors have great significance. One is the role of speculators and 
the second is “ ‘crony capitalism’ at the global level, in the form of IMF bailing out Wall 
Street.”197  Opportunities for speculators increase every time markets are opened, as do 
opportunities for the most powerful multinational banks. The role of the ‘bail-out’ 
mechanism is discussed below. Following the Asian crisis of 1997-8 a flurry of reports 
sought to identify the root causes.198 Story identifies two distinct interpretation; an internalist 
explanation which sought to blame the governments suffering the crises and an externalist 
argument focussed on the international financial markets.199 It is important to be aware of the 
possibility of ‘explanatory nationalism’ leading the IFIs to the most convenient explanation, 
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exonerating them from blame. A classic proponent is Moore; “most of the responsibility for 
these [Asia 1997, Argentina 2002] collapses lies with domestic policy-makers, of course” 
despite, in the same paragraph admitting that the very magnitude of money flows create 
forces so great that “they are difficult for all but the most powerful nations to resist.”200 
The ‘internalist’ explanation of the Asian cries sees the cause of the collapse “as lying in the 
close connections established within the states between politics and bank-centred financial 
systems. The states provided implicit guarantees to banks, encouraging the banks to lend to 
corporations with good political contacts. As capital controls were eased, foreign creditors 
lent to the banks and credit exploded despite multiple warning signals ahead of June 1997. 
Externally, the inflow of capital to the East Asian countries was stimulated by the near zero 
interest rates prevailing in a moribund Japan, and by continued investor pessimism about 
business prospects in Europe. Consumption and imports boomed, just as volume export 
growths plummeted. With China’s accelerated move into world markets, foreign investors 
switched their attention to opportunities on the mainland, so that east Asian balance of 
payments’ dependence on short-term capital flows increased. When the Thai ‘wake-up call’ 
came, alerted investors withdrew in haste from one currency after another.”201   
 The externalist explanation focussed more sharply on the instability inherent in 
liberalisation followed by ‘herd behaviour’.202 
 Recent crises involve twin banking and financial crises.203 “They were initially 
attributed to poor financial regulation and supervision as well as poor monetary policy, 
thereby putting the blame back on national governments and their “crony capitalist” clientele. 
. . It is now recognised that third generation crises are more complex, and may also include 
multiple equibliria effects, originate from abroad due to contagion effects or involve “crony 
capitalism” at the global level, in the form of IMF bailing out Wall Street.”204 Analysing the 
East Asia crisis, Stiglitz writes; “in retrospect, it became clear that the IMF policies not only 
exacerbated the downturns but were partially responsible for the onset: excessively rapid 
financial and capital market liberalisation was probably the single most important cause of 
the crisis, though mistaken policies on the part of the countries themselves played a role as 
well.”205 The most significant of those policies is the liberalisation of capital flows. The 
Eurozone crisis has followed the same path as the developing countries, including the 
structural adjustments of government policies. The Greek bailout coat £23billion the 
conditionality conditions were protracted and bitter with tough budget cuts. However 
“Despite the bailout, the ongoing fragility of the Greek economy was underlined by the latest 
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unemployment statistics, which showed the country's jobless rate jumped to a record 20.7pc 
in the fourth quarter of 2011. Young people have been worst affected, with almost four in ten 
people aged between 15 and 29 out of work, up from 28pc a year earlier. The Spanish 
economy is also struggling. House prices in the country fell by 11.2pc in the final three 
months of last year, compared with the same period a year earlier. It was the fastest pace of 
decline since 2007 when the National Statistical Institute's series began, and left prices 
around 22pc lower than their pre-crisis peak.” 206 
 
Loans from either the IMF or World Bank come, not only at a financial price but at the 
cost of agreement to ‘structural reforms’. While the IMF denies absolutely that it has any role 
in political matters many have argued the contrary case. Stiglitz puts the matter succinctly; 
“The IMF took rather an imperialistic view . . . since almost any structural issue could affect 
the overall performance of the economy, and hence the government’s budget or the trade 
deficit, it viewed almost everything as falling within its domain’ . There is now a significant 
democratic deficient in Europe. “The sheer reality of global corporate dominance has 
produced a situation in which human rights discourse struggles to retain critical distance from 
the human rights-colonising activities of formations of global capital . . . Quite simple, it is 
essential not to underestimate the influence of [Transnational Companies] TNCs in the 
current world order”207 Since the foundation of the human rights movement was the attempt 
to free people from the dominance of the state human rights discourse is struggling with the 
new dominance of TNCs which are supreme in world politics and economic influence.208 
This tells some scholars that the Human Rights movements are being captured by 
international capital or at least complicit with it, particularly in making inequality worst.209  
We will see some national corporate governance solutions in other Chapters which could 
lessen the impact of financial crisis by short-term strategies in companies including twin 
boards, employee participation and quotas of non-executive directors. Policy makers should 
study these solutions carefully and simultaneously make sure that these solutions will fit in 
the national psyche. The solutions will not be found only in corporate governance but also in 
tightening the ethical standards of lawyers and accountants.   
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Democratizing and De-Democratizing 
 Now we have seen how the neo-liberal theories of free markets, privatisation and a 
small state has been constructed, now we need to consider what are the implications for 
states, their governments, their populations and democracy:  Beck argues “ We are witnessing 
one of the most important changes there has been in the history of power. Globalisation needs 
to be decoded as a creeping, post revolution, epochal transformation of the national and 
international state-dominated system governing the balance of power and the rules of power. 
A meta-power game is in progress in the relationship between global businesses and the state, 
a power struggle in which the balance of power and the rules of power governing the national 
and international systems of states are being radically changed and rewritten.”210 Of course 
the new power in the game is the enormous companies especially the financial mega-banks, 
hedge funds and other speculators.  It is not only the state that has been hollowed out, 
governments and political parties have also been affected. Beck argues that the neo-liberals 
have hijacked the arguments; “This is why national governments and political parties are so 
bland because the neo-liberal agenda are seduced by the neo-liberal concepts.  “the global 
economic aims and principles of neo-liberalism breaks through national specificities and 
borders from the inside and accelerate processes of reform aimed at opening up the national 
to interdependencies”211 In particular such views lead to the undermining of the state as a 
responsible entity the purpose of which is to represent a collective morality and achieve a fair 
distribution of goods. It also inevitably points to the individual as providing the salvation for 
all, most importantly through the use of property transactions. The consumer as saviour is a 
direct descendant of these ideas. Globalisation is thus both driven by philosophies of open 
markets and fuelled by the consumerist, individual culture which operates at citizen level. 
Thus the citizen becomes a consumer with considerable impact on our understanding of 
democracy. If the state exists merely to mend ‘market failure’ so that the invisible hand of the 
market can create paradise for all, what use is a vote at nation state level? Further, if the 
‘market’ can manipulate politicians in the shape of threats and bribes from powerful 
companies, where is the citizen to exercise any influence?  
Many contend that for a variety of reasons democracy needs to mean more than churning 
almost identical politicians every few years212. The ability of such politicians to represent a 
wide range of possibilities has been severely eroded by a number of factors, some stemming 
from the ‘willing capture’ of the state213, others from globalization214 and the ability of 
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multinational companies to evade and supersede state regulation215. These twin forces mean 
that the state is ‘on the side’ of the multinationals and, if state authorities deviate from 
subservience to corporate interests they are able to evade regulation216 or leave. One of the 
consequences of the overwhelming consensus about the ‘proper’ economic path to success 
which has loosely been labelled the ‘Washington Consensus’ has been the ‘dumbing down’ 
of politics to a narrow centrist band which is obsequious  to ‘the market’ and consequently to 
large market players, most notably transnational corporations. This has led not only to the 
‘market state’217 but also to the fragmentation of power away from the traditional monolithic 
state structures. It has also led to the blurring of the boundaries between public and private 
realms, including public and private law.218 Regional and international agreements have also 
achieved fragmentation.219 This has made governance structures more complex and less 
responsive to democratic pressure. Power has become multicentric rather than monolithic220. 
Beck believes that “Globalisation . . . has introduced a new space and framework for acting: 
politics is no longer subject to the same boundaries as before”221 For Beck the pieces of the 
jigsaw of global politics has been rearranged partly by multinational companies222  
“The world to-day behaves like a madhouse. The worst of it is that the values we had 
more or less defined, taught, learned, are thought of as archaic as well as ridiculous. Respect 
for the world: who is that important to? The human being should be the absolute priority. 
And it isn’t. It’s becoming less and less so. It seems that it’s more important to reach Mars 
than prevent 13 million Africans dying of hunger. Why would I want to know if there’s water 
on Mars if we’re polluting the water here on Earth, doing nothing to avoid it? Priorities need 
to be redefined, but there’s no chance of redefining those priorities if we didn’t confront the 
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need to know what democracy is. We live in a very peculiar world. Democracy isn’t 
discussed, as if democracy had taken God’s place, who is also not discussed.”223 Perhaps the 
discussion should begin with the understanding that markets are not all-powerful; “Adam 
Smith’s invisible hand – the idea that free markets lead to efficiency as if guided by unseen 
forces – is invisible, at least in part, because it is not there.”224 
 Charles Tilly  rejects the argument that it is possible to identify a ‘borderline’ between 
democracy and non-democracy by an assessment of chosen factors such as those identified 
by Freedom House.225 Instead, Tilly focuses his definition on state-citizen relations and 
argues that democracy is always in a state of dynamic movement with constant pressures 
towards democratization and de-democratization.226  “Democratization means net movement 
towards broader, more equal, more protected and more binding consultation. De-
democratization, obviously, then means net movement towards narrower, more unequal, less 
protected, and less binding consultation.”227 In seeking to uncover the causes of movement in 
either direction he argues that there is a crucial difference between capacity of states and the 
health of their democracy. Here, capacity relates to states’ ability to implement their policies. 
“State capacity means the extent to which interventions of state agents in existing non-state 
resources, activities, and interpersonal connections alter existing distributions of those 
resources, activities and interpersonal connections as well as relations among those 
distributions”228 Democratization depends on a complex interaction between the democracy 
in the sense of broader, more equal, more protected and more binding consultation and 
capacity to deliver. Tilly’s central tenet is that democracy cannot be measured in the 
traditional ways which employ idealist, structuralist or instrumentalist approaches229 These, 
he explains, as “democracy as an idea that someone (the Greeks)230 invented, starting a 
centuries-long effort to implement the idea. We might take the opposite tack, arguing that 
only the conditions of industrial capitalism could support broad, equal, protective, and 
mutually binding political relations between states and citizens. We might also think that 
competing models of government, once familiar to national elites, attracted different sorts of 
ruling classes, and that some of those chose dictatorship and others democracy.”231 Rather, 
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Tilly argues that attention should be paid to processes to identify the movement towards or 
away from democracy. The processes he identifies are “increasing integration of trust 
networks into public politics, increasing insulation of public politics from categorical 
inequality and decreasing autonomy of major power centres from public politics.232 The first 
of these and its relationship with his definition of democracy is encapsulated by the 
following; “of breadth, equality, mutually binding consultation and protection, integration of 
trust networks into public politics most directly affects mutually binding consultation. To the 
extent that people integrate their trust networks into public politics, they come to rely on 
governmental performance for maintenance of those networks. They also gain power, 
individual and collective, through the connections to government that those networks 
mediate. They acquire an unbreakable interest in governmental performance. The political 
stakes matter. Paying taxes, buying governmental securities, yielding private information to 
officials, depending on government for benefits, and releasing network members for military 
service cement that interest and promote active bargaining over the terms of its fulfilment.”233 
Trust networks “contain ramified interpersonal connections, consisting mainly of strong ties, 
within which people set valued, consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at risk to 
the malfeasance, mistakes, or failures of others.”234 
It is clear that the trust between citizens in Greece, Spain and the UK and their 
governments has recently been strained.235 However even before the financial crisis 
inequality, particularly in the US and the UK has damaged democracy. Tilly argues that it is 
possible to have significant inequality and rely on political magic tricks to isolate political 
decision making from that inequality by mechanisms which do not reflect those inequalities 
in formal arena. I have argued elsewhere that this is only true to a very limited extent. Those 
who are starving don’t vote and even marginalisation can breed despair as having any 
influence. Where there is a dominant actor, such as the financial sector, governments are 
subordinated and unable to help its citizens. This is particularly cogent for the inequality 
debate.  Inequality fuels de-democratizing forces, the poor often no not vote but society can 
be split by divisions between classes, a new Apartheid.  Both Ehrenreich and Toynbee vividly 
portray  the ‘invisibility’ factor as part of the experience of poverty due to low pay in the US 
and UK respectively236. Fallows notes the lack of shared spaces and services. In the US “As 
public schools and other public services deteriorate, those who can afford to do so send their 
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children to private schools and spend their off-hours in private spaces- health clubs, for 
example, instead of the local park. They don’t ride on public buses and subways. They 
withdraw from mixed neighbourhoods into distant suburbs, gated communities or guarded 
apartment towers; they shop in stores that, in line with prevailing ‘market segmentation’ are 
designed to appeal to the affluent alone.”237 Toynbee writes London was a sadder, duller, 
more impoverished place. . . Wherever I walked, everything I passed was out of bounds, 
things belonging to other people but not to me. . . This is what ‘exclusion’ means, if you have 
ever wondered at this modern wider definition of poverty. It is a large No Entry sign on every 
ordinary pleasure.”238 This polarisation of society is neatly summed up in Klein’s metaphor 
of Fences and Windows to describe the separation of the haves and have-nots (Fences) and 
the opportunities for hope (Windows239).  
Such exclusion does not readily lead to political participation. Tilly apparently discounts 
the effects of the way in which inequality and discrimination is built into political systems in 
an institutional way, an issue discussed below in relation to institutional racism and 
corruption. Futher, the third process identified by Tilly is the antithesis to the inequality issue.  
That third process is decreasing the autonomy of major power centres from public politics. A 
revealing part of the discussion of this issue comes when Tilly deals with the de-
democratization of Russia by Putin “Yet in one regard Putin may surprisingly have been 
promoting longer-term changes that will eventually facilitate Russian democratization. 
Although he was permitting Russian military dangerously broad autonomy in the Caucasus, 
he was also subordinating capitalists who had acquired extraordinary independence from 
state control.” Here Tilly has missed the point and appears to be operating in a pre-
transnational corporate world. Corporations not only Rule the World240 but they have bought 
the politicians, if not with money then with economic argument and sheer economic power. 
The result of this is to corrupt the whole system. So democratization by decreasing the 
autonomous power of corporations can only come by accepting that what is required is an 
alternative approach to the economic system which decreases the reach of corporate power 
and its elites. This can only be achieved by popular pressure.  It is therefore arguable that the 
US, UK and Europe have significantly de-democratized in recent years  because of increasing 
inequality and because of the ‘willing capture’ by companies of the ‘market state’ giving 
significant autonomous power to corporations. 
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 The second process identified by Tilly as an indicator of democratization is equality 
“Democracy works better, and democratization is more likely to occur, when political 
processes, reduce translation of everyday categorical inequalities into public politics.”241 
Thus the argument is not that democracy cannot exist where there is significant inequalities 
but that these must not appear in the political arena. By categorical inequalities Tilly means  
“organized differences in advantages by gender, race, nationality, ethnicity, religion, 
community and similar categories.” 242  Democracy thrives on a lack of correspondence 
between  the inequalities of everyday life and those of state-citizen relations”.243 “Any 
substantial increase in categorical inequality also affects democracy’s prospects. Any 
substantial increase in categorical inequality that occurs without some compensating 
adjustment in public politics poses a serious threat to existing democratic regimes.” . ..”244 
“ Increasing categorical inequality threatens democracy because it gives members of 
advantaged categories means and incentives to: 
* Opt out of democratic bargains 
*  Create beneficial relations with state agents 
* Shield themselves from onerous political obligations 
* Use their state access to extract more advantages from unequal relations with non-state 
actors 
* Use their influence over the state for further exploitation or exclusion of subordinate 
categories, and thus 
* Move their regimes even further away from broad, equal, protected, mutually binding 
consultation”245 
Here the Corporate Governance is key, company law, social movements, human rights 
activism and corporate social responsibility must go hand in hand with democracy and why 
the arbitrary distinction between Corporate Governance and Corporate social Responsibility 
should be demolished.  This is particularly crucial because of the coming danger for the 
environment. The EU Aquis Communautaire should be truly a binding commitment to 
democracy not an administration of the Elites. Consensus politics as found in German could 
allow more participation in government and corporate governance.   
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The Environment and Corporate Governance. 
 
 
 For some time there has been a problem of pollution from companies because they are 
not internalizing their waste and costs.  There is also no doubt that there has been a 
significant export of ‘dirty’ industries and significant pollution from the activities of mining 
and manufacturing operations masterminded by TNCs across the world. "One of the keys to 
understanding the global problem of waste and pollution, is that much of its incidence in the 
developing world is due to developed nations' illegal shipment of their own waste to these 
regions. . . trucks entering Eastern Europe [from Germany] export hundreds of thousands of 
tons of waste that Westerners find too expensive or too inconvenient to dispose of 
themselves. The pressure is mostly financial. Under US and European environmental laws 
today, the cost of disposing of hazardous industrial and mining waste can be as high as 
several thousand dollars per ton . . . Shipping such materials abroad is often much 
cheaper."246 
The exporting nations can pose as environmentally aware: 
"Japan has reduced its aluminium smelting capacity from 1.2 million tons to 
149,000 tons and now imports 90% of its aluminium. What this involves in human 
terms is suggested by a case study of the Philippine Associated Smelting and 
Refining Corporation (PASAR). PASAR operates a Japanese-financed and 
constructed copper smelting plant in the Philippine province of Leyte to produce 
high grade copper cathodes for shipment to Japan. The plant occupies 400 acres of 
land expropriated by the Philippine Government from local residents at give-away 
prices. Gas and waste water emissions from the plant contain high concentrations 
of boron, arsenic, heavy metals, and sulfur compounds that have contaminated 
local water supplies, reduced fishing and rice yields, damaged the forests, and 
increased the occurrence of upper respiratory diseases among local residents. Local 
people whose homes, livelihoods and health have been sacrificed to PASAR are 
now largely dependent on the occasional part-time or contractual employment they 
are offered to do the plant's most dangerous and dirtiest jobs."247 
 David Leigh has written   on the Trafigura disaster where a ship unloaded cargo in the 
Ivory Coast killing many and damaged at least 31,000. The ship was loaded with toxic 
chemicals from Europe: “The UN human rights special rapporteur, Professor Okechukwu 
Ibeanu, wrote: "According to official estimates, there were 15 deaths, 69 persons hospitalised 
and more than 108,000 medical consultations … there seems to be strong prima facie 
evidence that the reported deaths and adverse health consequences are related to the 
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dumping.”248 According to Leigh “The documents reveal that the London-based traders 
hoped to make profits of $7m a time by buying up what they called "bloody cheap" cargoes 
of sulphur-contaminated Mexican gasoline. They decided to try to process the fuel on board a 
tanker anchored offshore, creating toxic waste they called "slops".249 A number of company 
internal e-mails were found: ‘One trader wrote on 10 March 2006: "I don't know how we 
dispose of the slops and I don't imply we would dump them, but for sure, there must be some 
way to pay someone to take them.’ The resulting black, stinking, slurry was eventually 
dumped around landfills in Abidjan, after Trafigura paid an unqualified local man to take it 
away in tanker trucks at a cheap rate”.250 Recently there is   disquiet with ‘fracking’ 251. There 
are many reports of environmental violations perpetrated by large companies.252  
Simultaneously the amount of extraction of minerals and other materials from the ground 
rises exponentially. “On the eve of India’s independence, Mahatma Gandhi was asked 
whether he thought the country could follow the British model of industrial development. His 
response retains a powerful resonance in a world that has to redefine its relation to the earth’s 
ecology: ‘It took Britain half the resources of this planet to achieve its prosperity. How many 
planets will India require for development?’We ask the same question for a world edging 
towards the brink of dangerous climate change. 
Climate Change 
 
  
 “There is “a looming environmental crisis, which poses a threat to the basic of our very 
existence”253 The IPCC believe “There is high confidence that neither adaptation nor 
mitigation alone can avoid all climate change impacts . . . Unmitigated climate change would, 
in the long term, be likely to exceed the capacity of natural, managed and human systems to 
adapt. Reliance on adaptation alone could eventually lead to a magnitude of climate change 
to which effective adaptation is not possible, or will only be available at very high social, 
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environmental and economic costs.254 There has been for some time a pollution epidemic but 
the climate change crisis has eclipsed this.  The corporate governance debate has not included 
the issues of climate change, rather shied away from internalizing environmental costs 
including carbon emissions. The sustainability industry is large but is beset by spin 
doctors.255 The Stern Review said that the negative effects of   externalising greenhouse 
gasses is “the greatest and widest-ranging market failing ever seen”256  Using the annual 
ceiling of 14.5 Gt CO2, if emissions were frozen at the current level of 29 Gt CO2 we would 
need two planets. However, some countries are running a less sustainable account than 
others. With 15 percent of the world population, rich countries are using 90 percent of the 
sustainable budget. How many planets would we need if developing countries were to follow 
the example of these countries?257 
 
At last we believe that anthropogenic is real: “we have slowly, and at times reluctantly, 
realised that humanity has become an active agent in the reshaping of physical climates 
around the world, so our cultural, social, political and ethical practices are reinterpreting what 
climate change means.”258 Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration requires states to cooperate to 
promote a supportive and open international economic system and demanded that “trade 
policy measures for environmental purposes should not constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade259” Agenda 21 of 
the Rio Declaration also says that international trade has been inequitable and this has been 
one reason for environmental degradation of the planet.  It is a paradox that the Declaration 
also believed in the logic of trade liberalisation particularly because it would be good for the 
world. Elliott argues that one reason for the argument is a semantic one; the rhetoric of 
international trade does not allow ‘protection’ against nations. She says “Can environmental 
protection issues be accommodated within the logic of trade liberalisation? Can trade 
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liberalisation contribute to overcoming environmental degradation or is it likely to contribute 
to further environmental degradation?  Is it possible in trade liberalisation discourse, to 
distinguish between environmental protection and environmental protectionism? . . .  These 
are important because ‘trade rules and agreements are   a major determinant of how natural 
resources are used, what pressures are placed on the environment and who benefits from the 
huge money flows. . . that cross borders with the exchange of goods . . . At a normative level, 
answers to these questions rest in part on different views about ‘protection’ – a ‘pejorative  
term’ for the trade community.”260 For corporate governance this matters because of the 
importance of the macroeconomic context where the WTO is crucial is heavily influenced by 
neo-liberal economics.  Deregulation and free markets policies and environmental protection 
are usually conflicting aims, although some scholars believe that a market solution can be 
found. . Paterson  promotes a privatized market   mechanism arguing  for  a   new paradigm 
known as ‘global environmental governance’  : “while such governance is commonly seen in 
terms of a tragedy of the commons arising out of the anarchy of the interstate system, it is 
more fruitful to analyse these dynamics in relating to a conception of global capitalism. 
While efforts to govern global environmental problems started out as attempts to regulate the 
side-effects of existing form of capitalism development, they have increasing been organised 
to channel capitalism in novel directions.”261 Indeed climate change is a new sort of ‘pure 
public commons’262 Since no state or individual can fashion a solution. Although it is clear 
that that inter-state rivals can co-operate in treaties, accords and protocols.263 The power of 
‘Capital’ 264 is so pervasive that even international law has been captured.265    Paterson 
shows that global governance has been guided by the Washington Consensus and the 
fetishism of markets today.266 Now privatisation has gone further, in a “dynamic change 
where standards and regulations are obeyed not by governments but in market rules by the 
market for the market”. 267  Paterson believes that market mechanisms are “shaping business 
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practice, potentially significantly. Should the variety of schemes to shape investment practice 
with regard to CO2 emissions – the Carbon Disclosure, Project, the Global Reporting 
Initiative, UNEP’s Financial Industries Initiative, and so on – succeed in generating a norm 
which treats CO2-intensive firms as financial liabilities, then substantial change in investment 
in renewable energy can be expected . . . But, on the other hand, privatisation not only entails 
firms attempting to self-regulate to organise and legitimate their growth, but environmental 
NGOs to fill the void left by declining regulation by states, through developing schemes to 
put pressures on firms to change practices268.” We will see whether these market solutions 
will work and   change the complacency around the climate change debate   and  ameliorate 
carbon emissions and whether corporate governance can be part of this movement However, 
here are already a proliferation of Carbon Trading markets269 but many commentators believe 
that  financial emission markets are only a way of making money rather than ameliorating the 
problem of climate change.  “Alongside the development of proposals for emissions trading 
schemes at global and national level was a positive explosion of activity by financial markets 
actors . . . What explains this explosion of activity is that, while emissions trading can be 
understood in terms of economic efficiency, it very definitely operates through the creation of 
new markets in which firms can develop economic strategies and secondary markets. In fact, 
the future markets in this instance existed significantly before the real markets. . . Emissions 
trading as a project has been, and continues to be, propelled by realisation by powerful 
financial actors that here was a new commodity to be sold, new profits to be made”270 Similar 
projects are criticised in the some way, including the Joint Implementation and the Clean 
Development Mechanism271.  Corporate governance mechanisms could affect the 
implementation of sustainable business; so far there are lamentably few effective 
strategies.272  This introduction has sketched some of the issues involving corporate 
governance in a global context. Now the national background will be considered. Although 
the sovereignty of states has been severely compromised recently, national governments have 
some power to act in regulating companies. Although there are growing international 
regulations to restrict emissions national corporate governance should also be part of the 
picture if the planet if to be saved. This would entail embedding environmental policies into 
corporate governance and probably this would mean that the neo-liberal model of corporate 
governance would have to be significantly amended.  
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